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in reputational  capital.
This paper is a product of the Financial Economics Unit, Financial Sector Practice Department. Copies of the paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NVW,  Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Biagio Bossone, room
MCI0-619,  telephone 202-473-3021,  fax 202-522-2031,  Internet address bbossone@worldbank.org. December 1998.
(55 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily  represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced  by the  Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterCircuit theory of finance and the role of incentives





This paper analyzes the role of the financial system for economic growth and stability, and
addresses a number of core policy issues for financial sector reforms in emerging economies. The
role of finance is studied in the context of a circuit model with interacting rational, forward-
looking, and heterogeneous agents. Finance is shown to essentially complement the price system
in coordinating decentralized intertemporal resource allocation choices from agents operating
under limited information and incomplete trust. The paper also discusses the links between
finance and incentives to efficiency and stability in a circuit context. It assesses the implications
for financial sector reform policies and identifies incentives and incentive-compatible institutions
for financial sector reform strategies in emerging economies.
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2Introduction
Financial sector reform has gained center stage in current international economic policy
debates. This certainly owes to the serious repercussions of the financial crisis that erupted in East
Asia last year, as it should be expected to occur whenever critical financial events in a country or
a region raise fears that market reactions could provoke widespread contagion. But the centrality
of the issue has to do with a deeper reason, that is, the understanding of the crucial role that
finance plays for the functioning of market monetary economies of production. Recent economic
research has provided important theoretical and empirical elements to such understanding. More
progress can be gained by further exploring the implications of the time dimension in the
economic process. This will be one of the undertakings of this paper.
The paper analyzes the role of finance for economic growth and stability, and draws policy
indications for financial sector reforms in emerging economies. Issues relating to financial crisis
management problems and corporate governance are not dealt with in the paper as these are the
subject of two recent World Bank policy studies (Claessens, 1988; Prowse, 1998).
The paper is structured in two parts. Part I analyzes the role of finance in a market
monetary economy of production: Section 1.  1 presents a circuit model of the financial system and
illustrates the main structural, theoretical and incentive-related policy implications of circuit
theory of finance. Section I.2 discusses the special role of the financial system as the core of the
circuit process, and reports on recent empirical evidence. Part II focuses on policy issues: based
on part I findings, section  1.  1 makes a case for improving incentives in financial sectors of
market-oriented emerging economies, and section II.2 draws elements for incentive-based
financial sector reforms.
3I. Finance in a market  economy
1.1 The circuit process of finance
Recognition of finance as a central determinant of accumulation in the development
process of a capitalist economy dates back to the works of Hilferding, Keynes, Schumpeter, and
Kalecki. Common to their different theories was the vision of the economy as a sequential
process where credit needs to be extended to enterprises, and money advanced to workers, for
production, investment and exchange to be possible. In fact, Wicksell had placed finance at the
core of economic analysis already in the late 1800's by describing the circuit structure of a credit
economy. But it was not until the relation between finance and investment was explored by the
cited authors, and until Keynes'  unconventional view of aggregate saving was formulated in the
General Theory and in subsequent writings (Keynes 1936, 1937a, 1937b), that a link could be
established between production, finance and investment in a circuit framework.
Over the last twenty-five years, the link has been studied more systematically by monetary
circuit theory', which analyzes the properties of the circuit process of a monetary production
economy where money is created through credit by banks and provides unique (transaction)
services. The theory studies how production, capital accumulation, and income distribution are
fundamentally affected by the creation and use of fiat-money. Crucial to this purpose is the
functional separation that the theory operates between banks and firms.
The macroeconomic focus of the theory, however, leaves the essential microeconomic
aspects of finance out of the picture. In particular, although recognizing time as a fundamental
determinant of the circuit, the theory does not draw the implications that uncertainty and
incomplete trust - as corollaries of time - bear for finance. The theory thus does not address
crucial questions such as why and how financial institutions exist and operate, nor does it
concerns itself with the consequences for the circuit process of different financial structures?
Moreover, the theory places relatively more emphasis on the monetary phase of the circuit, where
liquidity is injected in the system and starts the circuit, than on the financial structural
implications of economic sequential processes.
Significant positive and normative progress can be achieved by attempting to lay the
ground for a circuit theory of finance incorporating a microeconomic dimension. By framing
finance in an integrated structure, circuit theory helps to better identify causes and mechanisms of
breakdowns in market financial relationships, and to select ways that minimize their chance of
occurrence through appropriate incentives.
This section presents a circuit model of finance with rational, forward-looking and
heterogeneous agents, interacting under limited information and incomplete trust. The model is
used to show the features that characterize finance once time is introduced in a meaningful way
within production, investment, and exchange The circuit structure of the model is based on
Davidson's (1991) definitions of investmentfinancing  and investmentfunding  (Box 1), which
will be used throughout the text.3  Whereas monetary-circuit- theory models typically focus on
banks as circuit starters and liquidity providers, the finance-circuit-theory model presented here
emphasizes  the role of investment financial institutions as crucial to ensure the closure of each
circuit rounds and to determine the conditions under which new circuit rounds start. This they
4allow to do by reconciling decisions from savers and fund-users, as well as from investing
companies and capital good producing firms.
Box 1. Investmentflnancing  and  investmentfunding  in the circuit  process
Davidson (1991) illustrates the investment-saving  process as  chiaracterized  by  the
following  stylized  sequence  of steps:
1.  Companies  that want to add to their physical  capital stock (investing companies)
place orders  of new equipment  with capital good  producers,  and enter into contracts
that require  them  to issue  payments  to capital  good producers  upon  order delivery
2.  Commercial  banks extend short-term  credit to capital good producers to finance
production  by issuing  new deposits  (investmentfinancing)
3.  Capital good producers  use the new money to advance  payments  to workers and
suppliers
4.  Savings  accumulate  in the economy  as wage payments  are issued  and.  new incomes
are generated
5.  Investing  companies  seek  to raise accumulated  savings  by issuing liabilities  with a
maturity structure  correlated  with the income time-profile  expected  from the new
investment;  they use the funds  raised to settle  their contractual  obligations  with  the
capital  good  producers  upon  delivery  (investmentfunding)
6.  Capital  good producers  use the cash proceeds  to pay out their short-term  debt with
the banking  system
7.  The circuit  may start anew  with  new short-term  bank credit extended  to capital good
producers  for new production.
In fact, the circuit may start with capital good producers  undertaking  production  based
on expected investment  demand.  This, of course, raises the possibility  of imbalances
taking  place between  investment  demand  and supply  (see section.  11.  1.2).
1.1.1 Assumptions and structure of the model
The model includes four sectors: firms, households, banks, and the capital market. All
variables are expressed in monetary terns. Representative firmfproduces  consumption
commodity c and capital good I; household i provides middleman services 5, and household k
supplies labor services. At the beginning of the period, firmf borrows credit CR from the banking
system and employs labor services from household k at total wage cost Wk . Production
technology off  has constant returns (allowing for profits to be linearly related to supply).
Although implicit in this model, prices are assumed to ensure a positive margin on costs. At the
end of the period, fimnfrepays  its short-term bank debt with its sale proceeds. Household i buys
(wholesale) c,, fromf,  resells it (retail) to household k ( Ck ), and uses the proceeds to fnance
consumption and saving (c, and si, respectively). Household k's labor supply is linear in leisure
(i.e. it varies proportionately to wage earnings), spends income  wk  to purchase  Ck,  and saves the
remainder. Capital good I is purchased by firms (investing companies) that wish to add to their
original productive capacity. Investing companies fund investments with long-term borrowings or
equity from the capital market. Aggregate saving provides long-terrn funds to the capital market.
5Financial investment institutions compete in the capital market to attract funds; they screen and
select potential fund-users on the basis of creditworthiness, assess the quality, risk, and
profitability of  investment projects, allocate funds, monitor their use, and seek to enforce
contract obligations. They manage savings on behalf of savers, and may invest their own money
as well. Formally, the model is as follows:
Households
(1)  Yi  = Ck-CW
(2)  ck  = Yk  Sk
(3)  c,, =ack  O<a<l
(4)  c1 = yi  -Si
(5)  Yk  Wk  =  WCk + Wlk
(6)  SJ=ik = Sj(yj,rL)  sy  > O,Sr > °
(7)  S  j = S  j [z j (rL  7 v)  +  I-  zj  (.,.)]  0:  <zj  <  z-  <  l;  z,  >  0,  z2  < °
(8)  r=zJrL
Household i's income is given by i's revenue minus costs (eq. 1); i's revenue is determined
by k's consumption (eq. 2), and i's costs correspond to its wholesale purchases of c,, (eq. 3),
which in turn are a fixed proportion of sales ck (as the latter incorporate distribution services
value added). Identity (5) defines k's wage earnings as the sum of work compensations for
production of goods c and L Individual household savings are positive in both the rate of return
on saving, r  ,  and income (eq. 6), consistent with intertemporal utility maximization (see below).
Households invest a share z of their savings in long-term assets by placing money with
investment financial institutions in the capital market, and hold the remaining share in non-
interest bearing, short-term bank deposits (eq. 7). The share of savings going to the capital market
is positive in the long-term rate of interest, rL, and negative in the agents' perceived uncertainty,
v,  as to the future states of the economy. Note, however, that demand for long-term assets can be
rationed by investment financial institutions (see below), as reflected by term z-  in (7). The
overall return on household saving is a weighted average of the rates of return on individual
assets (eq. 8). The model includes rational, forward-looking, interacting  households that
maximize their lifetime consumption utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
Interactions and the sequential nature of the economy play a crucial role in the formation process
of saving in the economy. The assumption of intertemporal utility maximization allows for
interactions to be modeled within a framework where each household optimizes the information
on other agents' behavior, and discriminates optimally between temporary and permanent
changes in the economy. Formally, the household plans are:
(6a)  MaxU  = E[1fi1u(c,)],  s.t.
(6b)  A,+,  (1 +  r)'  - A, = st
6and to transversality  condition
(6c)  limAt  = 0
where A is non-human  wealth;  u(-) is a (well-behaved)  utility function,  and 0 < ,B < 1 is the time
discount  factor.  Solving  plan (6a)-(6c)  with dynamic  programming,  after substituting  from the
model the appropriate  equations  for consumption,  and noting from eqs. (1) and (2) that yi  = yCk,
where y = 1-  a,  yields the Euler conditions  for interacting  households  i and k:
(E.  1)  i  :  Oilr(wk,  - sk,) -si, ]=  ( +r)Efl  {Oj[  y(wk+,l  sk,+)  sit+1]
(E.2)  k:  Xk (w,  - s,)  = (1 + r)E/6[ok (wke+1  - Skf+l)]
where  q(.) = u' (.) is the instantaneous  marginal  utility  of consumption.
Firms
(9)  WCk =  VC(CW +  Ci)=  VC  O<Vc  <1
(10)  c'  =  E  c=  c
j=i,k
(11)  W&k = VI  O<v,  <1
(12)  Is  = E[Id ]
(13)  Id =Id  (  r-)  I >
(14)  A =,u(Ko +I)  ,'<  O
(15)  yf  =I+C-Wk
(16)  yf  =yf  -CR(l+rs)
Wage components  are fixed  proportions  of outputs c and I, respectively  (eqs. 9 and 11),
Consumption  good output  matches  actual demand  (eq. 10),  while  capital good  production  equal
expected  demand  (eq. 12).  According  to eq. (13), the demand  for capital good  I is increasing  in
the difference  between the marginal  efficiency  of capital ,  and the gross rate of return on long-
term funds rL (that is, including  intermediation  fees - see below). Eq. (14) says that ,u is
decreasing  in the aggregate  real capital  K (determined  as inherited  capital  plus new investment).
The gross income  off is given  by the proceeds  from its output  sales minus the total wage bill (eq.
15). Id. (16) defines  net corporate  income y'  as the income  left after debt service.  If net income
is negative,  the circuit  closes only if firms borrow  new money  or manage  to have their old loan
rolled over. Any  positive  net income  is saved  (id. 22).
Banks
(17)  CR = CR(rQ, (CR)) = wk  CR', >  0, CR'Y,  < 0,  > 0
(18)  D =  1  Zh)Sh
h=i,j,f,b,F
7(19)  Yb = 5/I-CRrI
Banks allow  the circuit  process  to start.  Firms  negotiate  with banks the amount  and the
terms  of short-termn  bank loans to finance  input  acquisition  and get production  started.  According
to eq. (17) the supply  of loans CR to firmfis positive  in the short-tem  interest rate  rs and
negative  in the perceived  risk of the borrower  default, yr.  Other things being  equal, the latter
varies  directly  with the amount  of loans supplied  to the firm,  on the assumption  that the
probability  of borrower  default  increases  as the credit extended  overruns  the firm's collateralized
assets. 6 Banks  thus increase  lending  to the point where  the marginal  revenue from lending  equals
the marginal  default  risk. The amount  lent determines  the amount  of inputs  that firms can
purchase  in the factor market.  Money  is created  asf s bank account  is credited  with the loan
amount.  Followingf s spending  on inputs, new  incomes  and savings  are generated.  Agents  may
hold a share of savings  in band deposits  D (id. 18).  For simplicity,  it is assumed  that no cash
circulates  in the economy  and that payments  are made through  deposit  transfers  from (and to)
bank accounts.  Deposits  are used as means  of payment  and as precautionary  savings.  It is also
assumed  that banks do not run production  and interest  costs on deposits.  Bank income  is given  by
the interest earned  on credit actually  repaid (in eq. 19, vi-  is the ex-post  rate of default  on debt)
and is fully saved  (id. 22).
Investment  financial  institutions
(20)  LFd  Id
(21)  LFs=  IZhSh  _  S
h=i,j,f,b,F
(22)  S=  SI  +y+Yb+YF
j=i,k
(23)  LFS = LFs (ri,rL-*)  LFr >0  if rL <￿rL*  and LFr =0  if rL > rL*
(24)  rL- =r,  + q
(25)  rL *=  r- - 0(rL )].  0'>  °,  v  " > ° S
(26)  YF  qLF
(27)  LF = I = min[LFs, LFd]
Investment  financial  institutions  play a central  role in the model as they enable the circuit
process  to close.  Conversely,  their inability  to manage  costs associated  with limited knowledge
and incomplete  trust is conducive  to circuit  breakdowns.
The demand  for capital good  I  from the investing  companies  is funded  with long-term
loans and/or  equity  funds,  LF (eq. 20), generated  by aggregate  saving  as indicated  in relations
(21) and (22),  and channeled  to investing  companies  through  financial  investment  institutions.
Investinent  financial  institutions  adjust  long-term  fund supply  based on gross rate of return  ri-
adjusted  by a risk-factor  increasing  in r7 (eqs. 23 and 24). Funds are supplied  until r-  reaches
its maximum  and are  rationed thereof  (eqs. 23-25)  in a Stiglitz-Weiss  fashion.  Note the difference
between  the supply  schedule  of short-term  loans discussed  above  and that of long-term  loans. The
latter is more fundamentally  commensurate  to the fund-user's  perceived  capacity  to earn a future
stream  of returns sufficient  to recover  the cost of funds.  An increase  in such cost may thus
prejudge  the fund-user's  solvency.  Relation  (21)  indicates  that long-term  funds  to the economy
8may fall short  of aggregate  saving  (see also section  11.  1.2);  this can result either from investment
financial  institutions  rationing  the supply  of funds,  or from them  being rationed in the capital
market  by fund-savers.  Investment  financial  institutions  charge  a competitive  unit fee q on the
funds  supplied  (eq. 24), reflecting  their value added  for production  of information  and trust; they
are assumed  to be cost-free  and earn income  YF  (eq. 26),  which they fully save (id. 22).7  The
supply  schedule  of financial  investment  institutions  bears important  incentive-related
implications  that will be dealt with in part 11.8  The investment  actually  funded (in Davidson's
sense)  is the minimum  between  the supply  and demand  of long-term  funds  (eq. 27). General
equilibrium  requires  that
(28)  c  + Is  =  ci  + Id  E
j=i,k  h=i,k,f,b,F
In equilibrium,  the investing  companies  raise enough  funds  in the capital  market  to settle
their contract  obligations  with the capital  good producers,  and consumption  good  producers  sell
all their output  in the market.  The circuit  closes as producers  use the proceeds  from sales to clear
their debts with the banks.  In the CTF model  proposed,  microeconomic  variables  v, rL  ,
ye,  tV-, S and q are crucial  in determining  the level  of real aggregate  production  at which
equilibrium  is attained,  and the efficiency  of resource  allocation.
Chart 1. The circuit
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9Although  the model's equations  do not bear explicit  time references,  a logical sequence
underlies  the circuit  process (see Chart 1). In Appendix  I, the equations  are reordered  according
to CTF  logical sequence.  In reality,  multiple  circuits  overlap  at all times as new credit is created,
new production  is carried out, and banks  retire debt on old production.
1.1.2 Structural implications of CTF
Circuit  theory of finance  (CTF)  bears important  implications  in terms of financial  market
structure,  microeconomic  imbalances,  and the role of saving for economic  growth.
Financial market structure. The  model marks the different  role played in the circuit  by the credit
market on one side, where liquidity  is created  to finance  production,  and by the  financial market
on the other,  where the existing  liquidity  accumulated  by savers  is allocated  to investments.  This,
in turn, implies a distinct role for commercial banks and investment  financial  institutions
whereby:  a) commercial  banks  operate  upstream  in the circuit  process,  provide  new liquidity  to
finance  production  in the form of own liabilities,  and act within  a short-term  horizon;  and b)
investment  financial  institutions  operate  downhill  the process  and act as capital  market
intermediaries  with longer-term  horizons,  collecting  liquidity  from savers  with long positions  and
allocating  it to investors  with short positions.  They  may as well invest their own  money directly.
Their function  enables  capital  good producers  to repay their short-term  debt to commercial  banks
and close the circuit. 9 Also, by directing  funds  to investing  companies,  investment  financial
institutions  are important  instruments  of corporate  governance.  As their long-term  income
eventually  derives  from their earned  reputation  as fund allocators,  their long-term  interest  lies in
selecting  best investment  opportunities  and in ensuring  good  use of funds  by investing
companies.
CTF shows  that banks and capital  market  institutions  perform  complementary  functions.
Depending  on the structure  of financial  sectors  and the stage  of economic  development,  these
functions  might  be carried  out either by separate  institutions,  or jointly by more universal  ones.
This, however,  should  not hide the distinct  nature and role that each function  performs  along  the
circuit.  Also,  complementarity  implies that even  in countries  where financial  systems  are centered
on capital  markets,  safe and efficient  commercial  banking  functions  (notably,  related to the
provision  of liquidity  and transaction  services)  remain crucial  for the efficient  and stable
functioning  of capital  markets.  The importance  of complementarity  between  banks and capital
market institutions  is confirmed  by empirical  evidence  (see section  I.2). Also important  is
complementarity  of the information  produced  in performing  each function:  through  account
relationships,  commercial  banks build up specialized  knowledge  of the enterprises' day-to-day
business  and liquidity,  and of short-term  developments  of demand  and supply  in the specific
sectors  and markets  where enterprises  operate.  Investment  financial  institutions,  on the other
hand, develop  greater  knowledge  of longer-term  business  prospects  and potential of investing
companies,  macroeconomic  economic  developments  and financial  market trends, change  in
fundamentals  that may affect the long-terrn  profitability  of their clients.
Finally,  a critical  implication  of the functional  distinction  and complementarity  singled  out
by CTF  is that those financial  systems  where functions  are segmented  are more prone to circuit
malfunctioning  and instability  (see below). Segmentation  in the financial  structure,  or outright
lack of financial  intermediaries  in relevant  segments  of the capital market, are  particularly
relevant  for countries  at early stages  of development.  They may create  severe  discontinuities  in
10the circuit and constrain economic growth. Such discontinuities limit the mobility of saving, lead
to inadequate investment funding and/or to inappropriate maturity structure of investment
funding; in period of economic booms, and especially in the aftermath of economic and financial
liberalization, they likely lead to excessive lending to capital good production and to use of short-
term lending for investment funding. Also, discontinuities may cause poor information
transmission across market segments and, most of all, they may set wrong incentives to the
efficient use of information from individual financial institutions, delaying their response to
market developments and eventually leading to macroeconomic imbalances, as discussed next.
Microeconomic  imbalances.  CTF and the microeconomic interactions built in the model produce
some interesting and unconventional theoretical results. In particular, the fo'llowing propositions
can be shown to hold in a closed economy (see Appendix II):
Proposition 1. For any given level of aggregate investment, changes in individual or sector
savings do not affect the volume of  aggregate saving, although they affect the economy's saving
ratio.
Proposition 2. Changes in aggregate saving can only result from  changes in the level of
aggregate investment
Proposition 3. Changes in the interest rate do not affect aggregate saving, although they may
alter its composition.
Importantly, the model shows that that the availability of aggregate saving per se can never be
an issue, as investment always generates an equal amount of saving, whatever the saving behavior
of agents. However, the model points to the possibility that savings might not fully fund
investments (in Davidson's sense), essentially impeding the closure of the circuit (circuit
breakdowns). This corresponds to relation (18) taking the inequality sign. As mentioned earlier,
the inequality may be explained by risk considerations. High liquidity preference due to
generalized market uncertainty may prevent the maturity matching of supply and demand of
funds, as households prefer to hold a lower share of savings in long-term assets, thus rationing
supply of long-term funds to investment financial institutions. In an open economy, the same
effect holds if funds flee abroad as a result of increasing uncertainty..Also, channeling savings in
tangible real assets - as it happens in least developed countries, or in periods of high monetary
instability - produces circuit breakdowns by preventing funds from flowing back into the circuit.
Circuit breakdowns may occur when agents hold part of their savings in bank deposits and
banks do not correspondingly extend new credits (or roll-over old credits) to indebted firms: as
money flow to the banks and no money is created, liquidity is withdrawn from the circuit and
firms are prevented from re-possessing the money spent on inputs, thus defaulting on debt
repayment. This implies that, with deposits outstanding in the agent portfolios, a stable circuit
process may be consistent with a positive net short-term debt position of the corporate sector vis-
a-vis the banking system, only if banks refinance indebted firms by the amount needed and for as
long as necessary (Graziani, 1988). CTF can thus provide a mechanism whereby an increase in
the agents' liquidity preference showing up in a larger  demand for bank deposits may create
circuit breakdowns.
At a more microeconomic level, inaccessible information on a fund-user or his low
creditworthiness may discourage investment funding. Similarly, the risk premium on individual
fund-users, or the level of transaction costs to deal with them, may require so high a return on
funds supplied that would make the ex-post return more uncertain. Also, moral hazard and
adverse selection problems likely rise with the interest rate charged and ma]ke  the investment
riskier. Under these circumstances, investment financial institutions may ration their supply of
11funds  and make  savings  unavailable  to fund-users  (even  though  these aggregate  saving equals
investment). 10
The integral  nature of the circuit  is such that misbehavior  from agents  upstream  in the
circuit  may  disturb the circuit  functioning  downhill  he process.  Also, in a repeated-game  context,
circuit  closure  (or unclosure)  may impact  upon subsequent  circuit  rounds  by affecting  agents'
budget  constraints  and expectations.  In terms  of the above  model,  a closure  failure would  feed
back on the banks' short-term  loan supply  schedule  and lead to credit  rationing  and a lower
activity,  as well as to lower expected  investment  and capital  good production.  Under protracted
circuit  breakdowns,  macroeconomic  imbalances  may eventually  arise.
Circuit  breakdowns  may  be caused  by structural  impediments  to capital demand  and
supply  matching,  or as a result  of inefficiencies  in the information  flow between  banks  and
investment  financial  institutions.  Circuit  breakdowns  more likely occur  where investment
financing  and funding  are segmented  and carried  out by separate  institutions,  specialized  in
different  maturity  habitats and operating  under limited  information  sharing  and idiosyncratic
incentives.  In such circumstances,  lending  decisions  of short-term  lenders,  who are not concerned
with long-term  risks, might  become  inconsistent  with conditions  prevailing  in longer-term
maturity  habitats,  leading  to overfinancing  of capital  good  production.  Figure I shows  financial
investors  rationing  investing  companies  at the point  of maximum  risk-adjusted  gross rate of
return, r,  *,and thus determining  a funding  gap equal  to S - LF(rL*, rL *).
Is  =S=EId]
rL
Lr  ........................ LF  d  Id
LFS
LF  (rL  *,rf*)  I, S, LF
Figure  1. Investment  funding  in CTF
Saving, investment andgrowth.  In a closed-economy, the interactions of the agents along the
circuit prevent changes in individual saving decisions from affecting aggregate saving, and are
such that no saving shortages can ever occur for any given level of aggregate investment.' 1 Why
12does saving matter, then? CTF introduces a new perspective from which to look at the role of
saving for economic growth. Bossone (1998a) shows that for a condition for equilibrium growth
is
(29)  *  = bi /[1 + (1 + i)d3A]
where a  is the economy's  saving ratio, b is the accelerator, d,/  is the change in capital good
production to output ratio,  i investment demand growth, and A is the output-capital ratio (see
Appendix III). Conditions (29) requires that the saving ratio vary directly with demand factors b
and i, and inversely with supply factors  d/J and A (Figure 2).
x, g
x=g  uR
X=b  =  (I +id6
-1  g = (bi/  I)-1
Figure  2. Saving  and growth  in CTF
It clarifies the role of saving in economic growth: to the extent that capital good production
is financed by short-term lending and that saving accumulates residually as production is
financed, saving cannot constraint investment'2; however, a low (high) average propensity to save
may generate inflationary (deflationary) pressures along the circuit. Macroeconomic policy
should thus steer the average saving ratio to the level where the economy achieves
macroeconomic dynamic balance. The role of saving for growth in CTF differs from its role in
neoclassical growth theory (Box 2).
13Box 2. CTF and Neoclassical  growth theory
Neoclassical  growth theory (NGT) holds that higher rates of saving are necessary  for the
economy  to shift  to higher growth  rate  paths. In traditional  NGT (Solow,  1956),  the saving  ratio
deternines the level of per capita output,  although  it does not affect the rate of output growth;
in endogenous  NGT (Solow  1994), the rate of saving determines  the output  growth rate. The
primacy  of saving in NGT rests on the following  basic assumptions:  1) at any time, output is
given at its full employment  level; 2) the act of saving  always  precedes  that of investment,  both
logically and temporally;  3) in a closed economy,  all saving is invested; 4) no increase  in
investment  can take place without  a corresponding  increase  in saving necessary  to finance it;
and 5) if ex-ante  savings  diverge  from ex-ante  investments,  the rate of interest adjusts  until the
two equal.  Unlike in CTF,  in NGT the agents' interactions  do not interfere  with the process  of
saving accumulation  since output is determined  by the intensity of factors use and is not
affected  by demand:  an increase  in the saving  ratio does not lower output  and translates  directly
into larger aggregate  saving,  thus freeing  up resources  for extra investment.  In fact, only two
(alternative)  assumptions  can make this result possible:  a) saving  and investment  decisions  are
taken simultaneously  by the same agents ("representative  agent" models fall into this first
assumption  category);  2) saving  and investment  decisions  are taken  by different  agents  but they
are fully coordinated  through perfectly competitive  and complete markets, so that if some
agents  decide  to decrease  their savings,  their decisions  are fully  matched  by others' decisions  to
decrease investments  (this assumption  is adopted  by Solow, 1994, sect. 2). As CTF shows,
short of these assumptions  and with agent interactions,  any temporal separation  of saving  and
investment  causes  the former to adjust to (and to always  equal)  the latter. In CTF, aggregate
saving  is residual  and the saving  ratio only affects  the macroeconomic  balance.  Gordon  (1995)
found  supporting  evidence  to this  reverse  saving-investment  relationship.
1.1.3 Efficiency and stability implications of CTF: the role of incentives 13
Depending on the economy's institutional setting (including the role of the state, restraints
on market competition, and restrictions on capital movements), the circuit process can produce
different efficiency-stability configurations, with related implications for the economy's incentive
structure. Consider the following - highly stylized - representations.
Early in the process of industrialization, as in XVIII-century Europe, the circuit process is
dominated by manufacturing firms and commercial banks. Family-owned firms specialize in
profit-oriented production and commercialization of commodities. Capital accumulation is mostly
financed by owners through own resources, and bank credit is used to finance production and
inventories. To ease commodity trade, firms extend private credit to each other, as well as to
buyers, often guaranteed by banks. A monetary system replaces barter as final payments are no
longer made through exchange of real commodities, but via transfers of third-party commitments
to honor payers' debt obligations, and as such commitments are accepted as means of payment in
subsequent transactions. As firms negotiate with their bankers the terms and conditions of credit
access, they and the bankers deternine  the total level of resource employment for the given
technology of production. Since firms internally finance capital goods used in production, they -
as a group - determine the share of total resources to be allocated to consumption and investment.
To the extent that labor market negotiations set the nominal wage and that trading involves only
14commodities already produced, firms (as a group) also determine the volume of output that they
would re-appropriate at the end of the circuit round (see Appendix VI). Workers' saving
decisions that turn out to be inconsistent with firms' production plans induce commodity price
adjustments to the point where enough funds flow back to them firms and enable them to service
their debt. The short-term interest rate on commercial bank lending deterrnines the real resource
transfer from firms to banks. The circuit underlying early industrial economies is rudimentary and
relatively stable overall. Accumulation is constrained by lack of organized finance for long-term
investment and depends almost exclusively on capital owners' personal wealth.
The structure of the circuit process evolves toward financial industrialism as demand for
capital equipment intensifies, larger financial resources need to be mobilized beyond the means of
wealthy owners, new firmns  specialize in capital good production, and banks use their earned
reputational capital to develop investrnent banking functions in financial intermediation.
Capitalism took on this route in Europe and America of late 1  800s-early 1  900s. With capital
markets in their infancy and relatively few (as well as unsophisticated and not well informed)
large investors, a seal of approval from investment banks ensure that firms enjoy unimpeded
access to capital at affordable terms. Banks provide investing companies with "patient money"
that can afford them to take a long view. 14 They make sustained investment possible, and their
reputation mobilizes funds needed to make the circuit operate smoothly. The other face of the
coin is that exclusive bank-client relationships develop with a common interest to protect firms'
cash-flow at any cost, thus leading to market opaqueness (by limiting disclosures of crucial
information), and to restrictions to competition through industry coalitions, cronyism and
monopolies. As a result, incentives to efficiency, innovation and new industries may weaken in
the long term.
To a large extent, the expanding role of the state in the economy (as experienced in the
industrial countries after the 1930s, and especially in the second post-world war period) replaces
investment banking at the core of the financial circuit, not only by directly absorbing savings but
by intervening in the allocation process through financial repression, directed lending, lending of
public money, and direct ownership of financial institutions. With the state as a large financial
intermediary, fund-savers need to be less concemed with the reputation of private-sector
institutions, as they increasingly revert funds to state-owned or controlled institutions on the basis
of the implicit guarantee of (perceived) unlimited solvency of the public sector. Also, the large
share of public spending on aggregate output stabilizes the flow of funds that firms need to re-
appropriate at the end of the circuit process. In terms of the CTF model discussed above, the large
role of the state in the financial sector would be reflected in a flatter long-term supply schedule,
with equilibrium at a higher level of investment, possibly beyond the point of equality between
interest rate and capital marginal efficiency. In fact, the cost of funds bears no relation to
borrower risk and to the value added obtained from production of information and trust. If
adopted, rationing would be decided centrally by the government, based on macroeconomic
policy objectives rather than on risk considerations. State-controlled finance ensures greater
stability of fund supply, but also causes inefficient selection of investing companies, firms' higher
moral hazard and weaker incentives to good investment and competitive production. The state
role as financial intermediary essentially severs the investors' decision to invest from their
incentive to earn a profit. The incentive effect at the economy's level is that large investment
results in long-term growth stagnation and a highly leveraged corporate sector.
The response to this state of affair involves a substantial correction of the economy's
incentive structure. This can be accomplished by repositioning the private sector at the core of
financial intermediation, in particular through establishment of financial institutions specialized
in investment financing. This route has been followed to date in the industrialized countries and
15in an increasing number of emerging economies. Investment financial institutions, such as
institutional investors, manage funds on behalf of small savers (households) and on the basis of
household risk-return preferences. Their reputation builds on their ability to satisfy those
preferences better than their competitors, and their market behavior is to reflect the household
objective functions as closely as possible. In line with CTF predictions, this implies that risk
aversion as well as sensitivity to risk and uncertainty tend to be greater than in more centralized
financial regimes. As a result, no exclusive lender-borrower relationship can survive in a
competitive financial regime as financial institutions need to retain the flexibility needed to
rapidly adjust to changes in market conditions. Nor information advantages can ensure permanent
extra-profits as efficient signal transmission competes those advantages away. Thus, fund-users
are subject to stronger market discipline since funds can be more easily withdrawn from
enterprises perceived to be riskier. This motivates corporate managers to select better investments
and pursue sounder strategy and administration. On the other hand, markets become subject to
higher volatility due to sudden changes in financing decisions driven by shifts in risk perception.
Thus, while resource allocation is more efficient than in alternative regimes, the circuit process is
vulnerable to higher breakdown risks. Greater uncertainty can more easily result in credit
restrictions to production and weaker incentives to long-term investment funding.
Emerging economies are moving rapidly toward market-led financial systems with an
increasing presence of (domestic and foreign) institutional investors. As their financial relations
become more and more dominated by profit-driven individual preferences, incentives may be
necessary to induce agents to pursue prudent and honest behavior, and support the overall
stability of the circuit process. In particular, with the growing role of market forces, the public
sector should pursue take actions to assist markets to achieve better efficiency-stability tradeoffs.
These issues will be taken up in part II.
1.1.4 Theoretical and methodological features of CTF
From the preceding arguments, the main methodological features of CTF can be
summarized as follows:
- CTF explains finance as the institutional complex aimed to minimize transaction costs
(associated with limited information and incomplete trust) in the exchange of promised
claims on real resources taking place in a sequential economy
- CTF emphasizes the complementarity between commercial banking and investment financial
functions in a sequential economy
*  CTF shows that in a market economy investment funding problems may cause circuit
breakdowns even though aggregate saving always equals investment
*  CTF reverses the neocalssical saving-causality nexus, and shows that investment determines
saving and that saving can never contrain investment
*  CTF allows for both neokeynesian-type disequilibria and  postkeynesian-type
underemployment equilibria to hold in the model as a result of rational individual choices, the
former due to risk-related credit and equity rationing, and the latter to high liquidity
preference driven by uncertainty. In particular, CTF explains production overfinancing,
excessive risk taking by investors, and changes in investment funding decisions in terms of
individual rational responses to economic incentives
*  By integrating money, credit and finance in a sequential process, CTF permits to identify
discontinuities and weaknesses along the circuit structure, and to assess their impact. It also
indicates how shocks can get transmitted within a circuit round and through sequential circuit
rounds
16*  by linking the macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions of finance and by involving
agents' interactions, CTF overcomes the analytical shortcomings of  "representative agent"
models of intertemporal resource allocation, as well as those of the pure macroeconomic
approach of monetary circuit theory. It creates a greater scope for studying the role of market-
compatible incentives in reconciling microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic objectives
*  CTF allows for comparative analyses of incentive structures underlying the circuit process
under different institutional settings and in different stages of economic development.
1.2  Finance,  growth,  and stability:  brief conceptualization  and
recent  evidence
CTF clarifies the role of the financial system in the functioning of a rnonetary market
economy of production. At the start of the circuit process, the financial system supports real
production by creating and advancing liquidity to producers; along the circuit, the financial
system governs the supply and demand of funds and, at the end of the process, it determines the
condition for the closure of the circuit. As discussed, the conditions under which one circuit
round succeeds or fails to close affect the way in which new circuit rounds start and unfold. With
aggregate saving accumulating residually as production is financed, investments are viable only if
they can be funded on terms consistent with their required profitability. The role of finance is thus
to ensure that all profitable investments get adequate funding at the lowest possible costs.
The microeconomic nature of such role emerges from considering that investments extend
the time and risk dimensions of the exchange process, calling on agents to trade current real
resource claims in exchange for (uncertain) promises to receive back real resource claims at some
given point in future (augmented by some appropriate margin). In a decentralized-decision
context, with a multitude of heterogeneous agents operating under limited knowledge and
incomplete trust, the financial system provides the complex of institutions, contracts, regulations,
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and exchange procedures that make the terms of
promises acceptable, affordable, and reliable to participants. Clearly, the higher the acceptability,
affordability, and reliability of financial promises, the wider can be the time-horizon underlying
agent decisions and the grater the circuit stability.
Financial institutions collect, process, and disseminate information. Building on their own
reputations, they provide confidence in markets where individual participants cannot easily
provide a basis for complete trust. To earn and maintain reputation they must see to it that funds
are allocated to best investment opportunities and that, once allocated, funds are used
appropriately by investing companies. Financial institutions also offer the benefits of economies
of scale and specialization by agglomerating capital and information that would otherwise be
widely dispersed. By virtue of their specialization and scale economies, they operate as delegated
monitors on behalf of investors.
Thus, the core role of the financial system, as framed in CTF, is to provide the
microeconomic setting to ensure that F  =d  and LF'  = S,  at the point where p  = r,  . This
allows the economy to optimize capital efficiency and the circuit to close under conditions of
macroeconomic equilibrium.'s The effectiveness of the microeconomic setting rests on the ability
of the financial institutions to overcome the information and trust scarcities of the economy, and
17to produce the correct incentives to reconcile choices from anonymous investors and savers, as
well as from different firms operating on the two sides of the capital good market.
Thus: In a market economy with limited information and incomplete trust, an efficient and
stablefinancial  system fundamentally  complements the price mechanism in  providing signals to
reconcile the opening and closure phases of the circuit process, ensure the smooth sequence of
circuit rounds, and allow the circuit process to grow steadily.  With  finance  increasingly
decentralized andfinancial  decisions reflecting the objective and reaction functions  of small,
risk-averse, and interacting individuals, the overall stability and efficiency of the circuit process
can best be achieved through incentives aimed to induce profit-seeking agents to internalize
prudence and honesty within their decision plans.
Finance is therefore crucial for developing economies that have embraced, or seek to
embrace, the market. Part II will argue that financial sector reforms based on incentives and
incentive-compatible institutions can help achieve the maximum developmental potential of
finance.
Recent research following the seminal work of King and Levine (1993) confirms that
strong links exist between growth and finance and that a better developed financial sector
precedes faster growth.'6 Analyses show statistically significant links between both the extent to
which commercial banks allocate credit and the tendency of financial systems to lend to private
firms, on the one hand, and productivity growth on the other.
More credit extended to private firms likely coincides with banks performing more
effectively their credit assessment, monitoring, and corporate governance functions, as well as
doing a better job of providing efficient payments systems, than would be the case if governments
and government-owned enterprises were the banks'  main clients. Although it is possible that
more developed economies lead to better financial systems, recent  evidence finds that economies
with deeper financial systems in 1960 saw faster growth in the following 30 years. This suggests
that the effect of financial sector development on economic growth is significantY'
Capital markets, too, have a positive effect on growth. Of 38 countries with the requisite
stock market data, those with highly liquid equity markets in 1976 saw more rapid growth
between then and 1990. And those with more liquid stock markets and more developed banking
systems experienced the most rapid growth rates. This complementarity of banking and stock
markets, which appears throughout most stages of development, likely arises because both debt
and equity finance induce better accounting, auditing, and formation of a cadre of trained finance
professionals. More important, as suggested by CTF, complementarity arises because efficient
equity markets need to rely on efficient banking for the provision of liquidity, payment, and
securities management services (OECD, 1993). It is only as countries reach the per capita income
levels of OECD countries that further stock market development seems to induce a decline in
firms' debt-equity ratios, as many of  those services are progressively produced by non-bank
financial institutions.
Convincing evidence of the relationship between finance and development also emerges
from a look at how financial resources are allocated among firms before and after financial
reforms. Schiantarelli et. al. (1994) found that, following financial reforms in Ecuador and
Indonesia in the 1980s, there was an increased tendency for finance to be allocated to more
efficient firms than before the reforms: with less intervention in credit allocation and pricing,
intermediaries were more likely to allocate capital where it would be best used, thereby raising
economic growth.1 8
18Moreover, a cross-country study with firm level data confirms that finance matters for
growth and highlights specific policy changes, such as improvements in the legal system, which
foster development (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1996). Cross-country research using  both
firm level and aggregate data show that improvements in legal systems foster growth (Levine et
al., 1998). Conversely, a financial system with structural impediments, or subject to instability,
can greatly disturb the economy's orderly evolution. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a) show the
substantial fiscal costs and the costs of foregone output associated with banking crises in several
countries over a twenty-year period since the mid-seventies.
Times of crisis are usually occasions for recognizing past mistakes; the currency and
financial crisis of East Asia has given great impulse to the effort to revisit fumdamental  financial
sector policy issues, ever since it became clear that the failures experienced in the region lay with
the weaknesses of its financial systems. The current policy debate draws heavily on lessons learnt
from East Asia's  crisis. Unlike the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, the problems in East
Asia revolve around private sector indebtedness transactions and, in particular, around the short-
term nature of private debt and the large portfolio outflows.' 9 Weak financial risk-management in
financial institutions and high corporate debt were major sources of instability. These created the
conditions for serious financial imbalances. Lack of information also played an important part, as
markets realized that many firms were much weaker than they had thought. Similarly, as the
crisis spread, lack of information may have led lenders to a generalized withdrawal of funds from
the economies, without discriminating between good and bad firms.
Also, as CTF predicts, segmentations between the short- and the long-term ends of the
capital markets may have been a cause of the excessive growth in short-term lending to the
region. At a time of over-heating and over-optimistic expectations, short-term lenders - typically
less concerned with the long-term risks of the investment financed, and in some cases lending
under the perception of implicit government guarantees on losses, increased their exposures to
domestic enterprises, even though signs may have growing of an unsustainable pace of capital
accumulation. As a result, the production of capital goods exceeded its sustainable demand. To
the extent that much domestic borrowing was funded by foreign creditors, it is fair to conclude
that not only domestic institutions but international markets as well failed to perceive the
increasing East Asian risk.
Thus, market failures weakened East Asia's  financial systems, causing excessive risk and
resource misallocations. Governments made things worse: unsustainable exchange rate pegs have
distorted the incentives in a way that led to the buildup of vulnerability, especially in the form of
rising short-term dollar-denominated debt. East Asian financial systems also suffered from
inadequate financial regulation and from too rapid liberalization. Domestic and external financial
liberalization increased competition for creditworthy borrowers, which reduced the franchise
value of banlks  and induced them to pursue risky investment strategies. In some cases (Korea and
Thailand), rapidly growing non-bank financial institutions were allowed to operate without
adequate monitoring. Also  the close link between banks, corporates and government and the lack
of a clear demarcation line between their different responsibility and interests (such as in
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) caused severe deficiencies in allocation and risk-taking
decisions.
The lingering effects of past policies that dealt with financial distress magnified the impact
of these weaknesses.  Several countries - Thailand in 1983-87, Malaysia in 1985-88, and
Indonesia in 1994 - had experienced financial crises that were resolved through partial or full
public bailouts. These bailouts reinforced the perception of an implicit government guarantee on
deposits, or even other bank liabilities, thus damaging market discipline. In some cases,
19management of restructured financial institutions was not changed, which did nothing to improve
incentives for prudent behavior.
11.  Financial sector reforms in emerging economies 20
Circuit theory of finance provides useful insights to draw a consistent strategy orientation
for financial sector reforms in emerging economies. By combining the macroeconomic and
microeconomic dimensions of finance in a methodological setup open to institutional change,
CTF offers a framework to design financial sector policies for countries in transition from
financial repression to market-based finance. In particular, by portraying market-based finance as
an intertemporal circuit process whose successful opening and closure phases depend on its
power to reconcile decentralized, CTF helps identify a number of core reform policy areas where
incentives can be improved to lead financial institutions to better perform their reconciliation
function. Such core areas range, just to cite a few examples, from the progressive elimination of
discontinuities in information and money flows along the circuit, to the provision of trust in
support of promises underlying financial transactions across the circuit timeframe, to the selection
of agents with higher reputational capital both to increase the circuit's robustness and to broaden
its time-horizon basis, to the inclusion in the circuit of agents otherwise barred from it by
unaffordable transaction costs due to structural impediments. To the extent that incentives are
crucial in the success of finance to reconcile decentralized decisions, the lead interest of part II of
this paper is to identify incentive-based policies that can align individual profit-oriented
objectives with the social goal of financial stability.
11.1  CTF and incentive-based  financial  sector reforms
As discussed in part I, the financial sector provides the information and trust necessary for
a market economy to accomplish its circuit functioning smoothly, as well as to expand the circuit
in a sustained and sustainable way. The links explored under CTF between the macroeconomic
and microeconomic dimensions of finance suggest that reforms aimed to strengthen the financial
sector in a market economy should seek to induce market players to reduce transaction costs by
generating and mobilizing information and trust.
This section makes a case for designing incentive-based financial sector reforms, that is,
reforms based on incentive mechanisms, rules and institutions aimed to align individual economic
motives with the public objective of financial stability. By allowing prudent and honest behavior
to be appropriately rewarded, financial institutions can be motivated to internalize prudent and
honest actions within their set of economically rational choices. Also, if financial institutions
operate in a context where individual misconduct hurts the others while good conduct lowers
transaction costs for all, they all have an incentive to undertake self-policing through which they
monitor each other's behavior and sanction misbehavior21
The economic literature offers plenty of examples and a sound body of theory in support of
the argument that, in an environment with limited information and incomplete trust, pricing
20honesty and prudence can be quite effective to reduce opportunistic and risky behaviors from
self-interested and rational individuals (Benson, 1994; Klein, 1997a).
Pricing honesty and prudence links the agent's stream of future profits from her business to
her past business conduct: as the agent proves dishonest or imprudent, her counterparties
withdraw from dealing with her, causing her to lose all future profits. Thus, pricing honesty and
prudence leads the agent to invest in reputational capital, that is, the value of her commitment not
to breach (implicit or explicit) contracts, or to take risks that might endanger her compliance with
contract obligations i 22 If the agent breaks the contracts, her reputational capital may be damaged
or destroyed. In equilibrium, if prudence and honesty are priced efficiently, the reputational
capital of an agent must equal the present value of the stream of future profits, or  franchise  value,
of her business.
The concept of reputational capital is meaningful in repeated-game contexts. The longer the
agent's time horizon, the higher the chance that her franchise exceeds short-term gains from
cheating. As noted in discussing the CTF model in part I, this point relates to the behavior of
private-sector financial institutions, and bears implications for the stability and integrity of the
circuit process in a market economy. Stability relies on the long-term commitment of financial
institutions to prudent and honest behavior. It is thus important that incentives to build a strong
reputational capital are in place. From the CTF features discussed in part I, three areas emerge
where incentives to prudence and honesty can be devised: competition, regulation and
supervision, and information.
First: competition. The overall competitive environment influences tlhe  incentive for
institutions to develop enduring franchise value. Policy has an important role in influencing the
degree and nature of competition both within the banking system and between banks and
investment financial  institutions. Promotion of competition has to go hand in hand with the need
for financial institutions to build reputational capital. A strong reputational capital mitigates
short-termism in institutions financing production upstream in the circuit, and motivates
investment financial institutions downhill the circuit to improve their capability to support sound
long-term investment. This helps to reconcile starting and closing phases of-  each circuit round
(intra-circuit stability), as well as to reduce shocks from one round to the next (inter-circuit
stability). As CTF indicates, a well balanced financial structure is necessary for competition to be
consistent with stability: incentives should be used to attract to the market the range and types of
institutions apt to fill the whole spectrum of (sectoral and maturity)  segments of the circuit, thus
eliminating circuit discontinuities. In particular, promotion of competition should take into
account the complementarity between banks and investment financial institutions emphasized by
CTF. This implies that incentives to non-bank financial institutions should be considered only
provided that  basic banking services and infrastructures are in place, or under development.
Finally, as economic decentralization intensifies, the role of finance as a bridge of trust needs to
be strengthened so as to reduce transaction costs.
Second: prudential regulation and supervision. The microeconomics of CTF discussed in
part I suggests that, as aggregate saving is in all cases equal to investment -- once agents'
interactions are duly factored in - competing for savings in the capital mark-et  is less a question of
bidding higher prices to induce more production of a "scarce" resource, and more a matter of
bridging the gap of trust that separates anonymous savers from fund-users 
23 Access rules to
markets and the incentive structure built in regulations should thus ensure that participants aim at
accumulating and maintaining strong reputational capital. Also, bridging trust gaps involves
externalities to the extent that dishonest and imprudent action from one market participant may
damage the reputational capital of others, and that sound financial infrastructures that strengthen
21trust and prudence increase the return to all participants. Thus, producing and maintaining
financial infrastructures require cooperation both among market participants at the industry level,
and between the private and public sectors. In particular, externalities in production of trust and
prudence call for private-sector self-policing arrangements as generating incentives to higher
efficiency and stability.
Third: information. The incentives for acquiring, exploiting, and disseminating information
are central to the effective functioning of a financial circuit process. On the one hand, the
emergence of a market for financial information is necessary to the integrity and stability of the
circuit, especially as both decentralization of decisions and agent interdependence increase. In
particular, CTF shows that efficient information provision is essential to reconcile choices from
firms producing capital goods and investing companies, and choices from savers and fund-users.
Reconciliation of such choices is vital both for intra-circuit and inter-circuit stability. Also, as
CTF suggests, the stability of the circuit benefits from reducing segmentations that hamper
efficient information flows and distort incentives to optimal intertemporal decisions. Banks must
be able to assess the debt-repayment capacity of individual firms in deciding whether to
refinance indebted firms at the end of the circuit round and under what conditions. They therefore
stand to benefit significantly from factoring the long-term market potential of borrowing firms in
their risk analysis. The higher their reputational capital, the stronger their incentive to lengthen
the time horizon of their approach to risk management. Similarly, investment financial
institutions would benefit from gaining knowledge associated with undertaking commercial
banking relationships with fund-users, as these can provide relevant and timely information on
changes in business conditions and market moods. Finally, personal and social linkages
characteristic of the information structure in informal financial markets can be exploited to
maximize complementarity between formal and informal finance, especially in countries at early
stages of development with large shares of population beyond the reach of the formal financial
circuit.
A financial sector reform strategy based on incentives is especially fitting where the need to
economize on scarce resources is more pressing and the circuit is riddled with discontinuities in
information and trust. In particular, four contentions justify the use of incentives for financial
sector reforms in emerging economies:
*  Incentives to prudence and honesty can protect the stability of the circuit by directing private
sectorforces  unleashed by liberalization. Many developing countries have undertaken the
transition from financial repression to market-based finance. The vulnerabilities  of market-
based finance, discussed earlier, call for major institutional measures to prevent or minimize the
likelihood of circuit breakdowns. Such vulnerabilities are most acute during liberalization, when
private-sector agents are suddenly allowed to operate across a broader decisional space than
under financial repression, with unpredictable shifts in structural parameters and very limited
knowledge. Under these circumstances, incentives and incentive-compatible regulations are
essential to induce agents to factor prudence and honesty in their action plans during and after
reform.
*  Emerging economies sufferfrom  relatively scarce institutional resources in both the public
and the private sector. In emerging economies the resources to be devoted to monitoring and
enforcing rules and regulations are typically more scarce than in industrial countries. The
necessary skilled human resources have a relatively higher opportunity cost (and the
technologies available for control purposes are presumably less effective) than in industrial
countries. Incentives to induce self-policing within the private sector would complement public
sector's efforts to enforce rules and best practice standards.
22*  If information and trust are scarce, there is a potential marketfor  them. Where information is
scarce and asymmetrically distributed, trust is incomplete and the incentives for opportunistic
behaviors are significant, big profits can be extracted from providing reliable information and
from building trust, provided that the returns can be appropriated by private agents. Where these
activities are inhibited by problems of non convexities (externalities, internalities, or lack of
coordination), the public sector can take action to induce the private sector to provide them,
either cooperatively or in a competitive setting. The public sector may also engage directly in
providing such services.
*  Incentives may improve the efficiency-stability tradeoff. Unlike regulatory practices that seek
to achieve stability by constraining business activities, incentive schemes that reward market
participants for prudent and honest conduct improve the efficiency/stability tradeoff. In
financial risk-management, rules can be designed that encourage private sector institutions to
reduce risk exposures and economize on capital. 24 Also, letting financial players choose their
own risk control methods, under the threat that ex post miscalculation is penalized, gives them
an incentive to improve their procedures to reduce errors that lead either to inefficient capital
allocations or to insufficient risk coverage.21
Emphasizing incentives is not to deny the importance of good rules, capable
regulators/supervisors and strong enforcement measures; it is to suggest that the returns on
investments to set up rules, supervisory institutions and enforcement mechanisms can be higher if
market players have an incentive to align their own objectives with the social goal of financial
stability. Public-sector investments in regulatory/supervisory systems could thus focus more on
improving the quality (rather than on expanding the quantity) of the resources employed in
regulatory/supervisory activities. An incentive-oriented regulatory/supervisory culture would also
promote the osmosis of expertise between the public and the private sector. A large osmosis
would also strengthen cooperation between regulators and regulatees.
Specific incentives-related policy issues and recommendations are discussed below.
11.2  The elements of incentive-based financial sector reforms
11.2.1  Competition
Balancing competition with incentives to create franchise value
Financial sector reform should induce financial institutions to invest in reputational capital. For
financial institutions that are underdeveloped and were previously subject to state controls,
measures to increase the value of bank-franchises should be adopted. Some mild financial
restraints may be needed to balance competition with incentives to induce domestic institutions to
accumulate sufficient  reputational capital; before being exposed to  fullfinancial  liberalization.
CFT stresses the importance of banks as circuit-starters. To the extent that they often
represent a large share of domestic finance, as is generally the case in developing economies,
banks play a fundamental  role also downhill the circuit as long-term financial investment
institutions. It is therefore essential that financial sector reform starts by looking at the incentives
for banks to invest in reputational capital. In cases where the franchise value of such institutions
23is low, rationalizing the financial industry is key. Authorities should aim to ensure an adequate
number of private institutions with sufficient franchise to induce them to invest in reputational
capital. This might involve mergers of exiting private institutions or privatization of state-owned
financial institutions. Restructuring troubled institutions, too, offers opportunities to reposition i S
them in the market and improve their profitability. Prospects for higher franchise value could also
benefit from allowing financial institutions to operate across the maturity spectrum and in various
market segments, provided that in each segment they would be supervised in a consolidated
fashion.
Investment in infrastructure (including, notably, telecommunications) can significantly
increase bank franchises by lowering transaction and operational costs. Real sector restructuring  iv
and investments would also have important positive indirect effects on franchise value, because
of long-term productivity gains that would strengthen borrower net worth and broaden the
domestic borrower base.
Some mildfinancial  restraints on banking competition could also be a way to increase the
franchise value of domestic institutions, especially in least developed countries and in those
emerging from long periods of financial repression, or in deep financial crisis and restructuring
their financial sector. 26 Moderate restraints such as time-bound market-based deposit rate ceilings
and restrictions on market entry may have a large rent creation effect that would allow banks to
raise profits during the initial phase of reform, giving them incentives to invest responsibly and to
monitor the perfornance  of borrowers carefully. Especially for banks that have operated for long
periods under heavy financial repression with state-administered interest rates, the introduction of
a market-linked ceiling on deposit rates could provide a gradual way toward full interest rate
liberalization.
Hellmann et al. cit., show that the degree of restraints necessary to produce significant
rents is such that would not generate large financial market price distortions. Also, to the extent
that banks respond positively to the incentive by investing in reputational capital, the below-
market interest rate on deposits would reflect their lower prospective riskiness, thus partly
absorbing the distortion effect. Restraints should only apply in the early stages of reform and be
phased out as banks, in the judgment of supervisors, accumulate sufficient reputational capital. In
particular, supervision should ensure that rents are used for internal reorganization and
restructuring, to improve the quality and safety of financial services, and to build a stronger
capital base. Supervisors should also ensure that banks develop internal skills to evaluate risks in
a competitive environment and adopt appropriate risk-management systems.
The ceiling on deposit rates should be set at a level generously above inflation, making
allowance for some possible inflation variability, and slightly below its underlying market level.
The ceiling could be anchored to an international interest rate on a comparable instrument (i.e., a
money market rate) and adjusted for expected exchange rate movements of the domestic
currency. Attempts from banks to circumvent the ceiling to attract new small depositors would
have to be made known to the public and would thus be detectable by supervisors 7
Deposit rate controls should be accompanied by restrictions on market entry from other
banks and non-bank financial institutions, as new entries might compete rents away. Temporary
restrictions on market entry may be warranted to protect domestic financial institutions while they
build reputational capital, but they should be balanced against the desirability of a financial sector
that is open to domestic and foreign competition. Entry restrictions should eventually be replaced
by strong and safe rules for market entry. These should include minimum requirements on capital,
on organizational and operational structures, and on risk-management capacity. Strong criteria for
24evaluating whether bank owners and managers are "fit and proper" are crucial. Licensing
requirements and standards, as well as their enforcement, should be transparent and based on
objective criteria. They should be set at levels that imply serious initial commitments from
owners and management wishing to enter the market; this would help the authorities select well
motivated market entrants, induce potential entrants to evaluate correctly the prospects for sound
business, and protect franchise value from entry of unfair and imprudent competitors.
Foreign participation in financial reorganization and restructuring,  or de novo entry, should
be explored, bearing in mind the need to weigh the potential gains against possible adverse
consequences for domestic firms. Recent empirical evidence from a group of eighty industrial and
developing countries (Claessens, Demirguic-Kunt,  and Huizinga, 1998) shows that a larger share
of foreign bank ownership (and so greater competition) forces domestic banks to operate more
efficiently through higher competition in national banking markets. Moreover, foreign entry can
strengthen domestic financial markets by bringing in experience and technology, and by allowing
greater diversification of individual portfolios. Some countries that had experienced large shocks
- triggered in part by macro and micro distortions - reacted by quickly opening up to foreign
financial firns  and benefited, suggesting that internationalization can overcome the risks and up-
front costs, including reduced franchise value, for domestic firms. In Mexico and Venezuela,
foreign banks emerged as key players in recapitalization of banks; in Poland and Hungary foreign
banks brought much needed know-how and capital; and in Argentina and New Zealand, foreign
banks also brought fresh capital. In transition economies, cooperation between foreign and
domestic banks has helped to improve capacity of local institutions.
Foreign financial institutions  also have proven to be a source of stable funding in the face
of adverse shocks. Following the Tequila  crisis of 1994-95, the Argentine  authorities  allowed
more foreign participation in their banking system, and by late  1997, nine  of the top ten banks
were  majority  foreign  owned.  In  Mexico,  after  restricting  bank  privatization  to  domestic
residents, authorities  allowed  sharp increases in  foreign participation  in banking  following the
peso crisis. In both countries, foreign banks supported the circuit by maintaining  access to off-
shore  funding,  while  domestic  banks  experienced  strains.  In  some  East  Asian  countries,  as
uncertainty increased, depositors moved to locally based foreign banks, thus retaining deposits for
the local circuit.
Creating a domestic investor base
An important medium-term objective offinancial  sector reform is to endow the economy with a
modern capital market and to encourage market entry by institutional investors. Completing the
financial market structure reduces transaction costs and helps allocate savings to the best
investment opportunities.
CFT emphasizes the importance of  investment financial institutions for the economy's
dynamic equilibrium and efficient intertemporal allocation of resources. Creating a stronger
investor base amounts to strengthening the circuit by completing the financial market structure of
the economy, thus eliminating discontinuities in the transmission of information and money
flows, and enhancing the provision of trust to support larger and more articulated sets of financial
promises. Better investment opportunities can be selected and sustained, more savings can be
mobilized, demands and supplies of funds can be matched at lower transaction costs and with
appropriate maturity, and the circuit process can operate more smoothly and on a growing scale.
25However, as banks play a predominant role, especially in the least developing countries,
governments should move gradually. They should first concentrate scarce resources on
establishing sound banking foundations, and plan to remove impediments to capital market
development as a medium-term objective. The elements that will contribute to a sound banking
system - such as good infornation  and risk-management capabilities, a strong legal and
regulatory framework, and reliable services in payments, liquidity and securities management -
will be important for capital market institutions as well. In fact, accelerating capital market
development before consolidating the banking structure could lead to a weak circuit.
Institutional investors are the backbones of modem capital markets. They can mobilize
substantial resources, increase the liquidity and depth of domestic capital markets, help agents to
both overcome information constraints and diversify risks. In emerging countries, venture capital
funds can support investments in the small and medium-size enterprise sector, attracting financial,
technological and managerial resources from abroad and promoting industrial innovation.
The development of institutional investment, with the support of the banking system,
should be accompanied by strong prudential regulation and supervision. These should govern the
relationships between banks and their affiliated non-financial and financial firms. In particular,
regulations should limit concentrated ownership of banks by non-banks; it should also limit the
ways banks can use links with their non-bank affiliates and subsidiaries. Banks, for instance,
should not be allowed to transfer risks from these entities upon themselves so as to benefit from
government safety nets; also, a bank should not be allowed to monopolize an activity to its own
advantage by establishing subsidiaries and affiliates. To this end, banks should be asked to report
and disclose  information on their affiliates and subsidiaries, indicating ownership, strategy,
portfolio and risk structure. 28 Comprehensive and consolidated supervision of the entire banking
industry is essential. A strong legal and regulatory framework, in particular in the area of
investor protection, should be put in place for trust in the new institutions to emerge. Investment
fund regulation should address prudential rules, custodial arrangements to protect investors in the
event of fund insolvency, rules to enhance transparency of funds' strategies. Legislation should
also require independent directors on the board of the funds.
To the extent that domestic financial law allows banks to operate in various financial
market segments, institutional investors (closed-end funds, mutual and pension funds, and so on)
would not weaken the domestic banking industry. In fact, under appropriate incentives, banks
may help to build confidence in capital market institutions and investments. As domestic banks
enter new market segments trough their affiliates, they would be motivated to strengthen and
develop banking services relating to liquidity and securities management necessary for them to
operate efficiently in the new fields. Moreover, banks' money management skills (which could be
scarce in the early days of institutional investment) could be an asset for new fund managers.
Finally, the investor base could also be enhanced by permitting banks to undertake long-
term investment relationships with industrial enterprises (universal banking). Universal  banks
with high reputational capital can contribute to improving corporate governance; this occurs as
their reputation stands to lose from unsound behavior of their client companies. Their long-term
interest in client companies gives them an incentive to monitor the company strategy and
operations. Universal banks can exert discipline on client companies by pressing executive board
decisions and/or by rationing credit. Recent historical evidence - both anecdotal and analytical -
shows the positive influence that universal banks exerted on corporate business in the US in the
pre-World War I period (Chernow, 1997; De Long, 1991).
26Universal banking, however, may suffer from serious weaknesses: first, even good
reputation in banking is not by itself guarantee for good competence in industrial matters. Second,
the discipline effect vanishes if banks over-extend financial support to insolvent firms, or if they
hide to the market important information on their clients, and if they restrain the companies'
freedom to search for more competitive sources of funds. Limits to bank holdings of corporate
stocks, supervision of banks'  governance methods on corporates, and effective incentives for
in:Formation  provision and rule enforcement should therefore accompany the development of
universal banking in countries undergoing financial sector reform. In the end, only an open
environment where universal banks are forced to compete with a broad range of capital market
institutions best protects the health of the bank-borrower relationship and limit abuses.
M[anaging  capital flows
Especially while the process of reforming the financial sector is still underway, governments may
want to consider whether to place, or maintain, temporary restrictions on short-term capital
flows. Managing capitalflows  can prove  useful in compleme  nting measures to protect, and to
possibly enhance, the reputational capital of domesticfinancial  institutions. Encouraging long-
term capital inflows may strengthen the financial circuit.
Although no empirical evidence confirms yet unequivocally the economists'  belief that
capital account liberalization brings higher growth, financial openness can be regarded to be
beneficial to the economic welfare of individuals and societies in the same sense that the creation
of a market for financial resources does in any country in terms of better resource allocation and
risk diversification. There is also general consensus on the idea that open financial markets and
financial market integration exert powerful discipline on national policymakers, putting pressure
on them to redress macroeconomic imbalances when these are deemed to be unsustainable.
Experience shows, however, that short-term capital flows could be destabilizing. Short-
term capital - especially trade credit - is essential to keep the economy moving, but when short-
term lenders have weak incentives to take a longer view of the economy, short-term lending may
cause circuit breakdowns. In East Asia before the crisis, with restrictions limiting long-term
capital inflows, domestic commercial banks raised short-term funds abroad which they then on-
lent to domestic enterprises. In some cases, domestic enterprises could directly raise short-term
finance abroad to fund long-term investments. Foreign lenders underestimated credit risk on
domestic borrowers, and the latter overlooked the signs of unsustainable capital accumulation. As
a result, short-term capital continued to flow in the region even as long-term domestic savings
start fleeing abroad, until the direction was dramatically reversed when risks were suddenly
reassessed. Also, circuit discontinuities may have segmented information transmission and
distorted the incentive structure of agents operating in different maturity habitats.
While higher long-term capital inflows should be supported, short-term money flows could
be controlled, especially early in reform. Government should at least eliminate tax, regulatory and
policy distortions that in the past may have stimulated short-term capital inflows. Among
distortive factors, a relevant one is the perception of implicit guarantees from the public sector to
foreign lenders. When lenders assume that the public sector stands to bail out their losses in the
event of borrower default, short-term lending is likely to be more forthcoming than long-term
lending, since the value of the guarantee is higher in the short term.9
Other relevant distortive factors may hide inside government financial regulations. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand liberalized the current
27account and allowed corporates to borrow short-term funds from abroad, while they kept
restrictions on long-term credits and direct foreign investment until as late as 1997 (Thailand) or
1998 (Korea, Malaysia). As a result, corporates reverted to short-term foreign borrowing, with
this trend accelerating after 1992 for all four countries (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1998).
Better regulation can certainly avoid perverse incentives of this type. Also, use of risk-based
capital requirements that would incorporate not just credit risk but interest rate and other risks as
well might improve the incentive for holding a more balanced portfolio structure in terms of asset
and maturity composition. In this respect, the higher the quality of the risk-adjusted capital
requirement calculations, the more efficient the lenders' resulting portfolio term structure and
capital protection.
A more radical way to deal with circuit stability is the inhibition of short-term capital
inflows altogether. 30 Restrictions on short-term flows may buy time for both domestic financial
institutions and supervisory authorities to accumulate more reputational capital. This could be the
case, for instance, in India if the authorities pursue further with the second generation financial
sector reform and commit to gradually deregulating capital flows. 31 Restrictions could take
various forms, examples of which are: taxes on short-term maturity foreign loans, such as in
Chile; limits to tax deductibility for interest on debt denominated in, or linked to, foreign
exchange; taxes on foreign purchases of domestic bonds (adopted in Brazil); limits on net open
foreign exchange positions of commercial banks (Indonesia); non-remunerated reserve
requirements on direct external borrowing by firms (Colombia); ban on sales of short-term
securities to foreigners by residents, regulatory prohibition of remuneration of domestic currency
deposits held by foreign institutions, and imposition of fees on non-interest-bearing foreign
deposits (Malaysia). 32
Capital restrictions typically bear the inefficiencies that all restrictions to market behavior
usually involve. Over time, while their costs increase, their effectiveness wears out as agents find
ways to elude controls. In many cases, the administrative nature of restrictions creates perverse
incentives to rent seeking from government bureaucrats, and to corruption and fraud.
Policymakers should be very sensitive about the risks involved in adopting restraints. Their use
should be justified when, depending on economic contingencies: i) the benefits from greater
stability through restrictions exceeds the efficiency losses, or ii) in the context of the reform
strategy, temporary use of restrictions may strengthen the incentives introduced with reform. As
already discussed, this last point refers to cases where restrictions may help domestic financial
institutions build up reputational capital at the onset of reforn.
Stimulating long-term capital inflows might improve the maturity matching of domestic
investment demand and foreign capital supply, enhance intra-circuit and inter-circuit stability,
and induce sustainable investment as risk assessment on lending incorporates longer-term factors.
Government should encourage foreign direct investment in the financial sector, which is more
stable and brings in knowledge and technology. As already noted, foreign participation in
domestic financial restructuring should also be considered by the authorities as a way to increase
the franchise value of domestic weak institutions. Government could relieve or eliminate
restrictions on foreign investment, such as limits on ownership by foreigners, differential
treatments of foreign investors, controls and regulatory requirements delaying  the repatriation of
capital gains and dividends. Also, as the quality of the information produced by the financial
sector improves, developing a strong institutional investor base would help attract long-term
savings from abroad that would strengthen domestic investment funding.
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Strengthening prudential supervision and regulation
Governments  should complement  the creation  offranchise value by adopting  a regulatory
regime based  on rules designed  to align the  private incentives  of market  players with the  social
goal offinancial stability,  and by strengthening  their  supervisory  practice.
For the financial  circuit  to operate  smoothly  and under stable  conditions,  creation  of
franchise  value should  go hand in hand with development  of a strong  regulatory  and supervisory
regime. This should  include incentives  to align the interests  of owners  and managers  of market
institutions  with financial  stability,  and effective  enforcement" 3 The financial  sector  law adopted
in Chile after the 1982  banking  collapse,  as well as the  regulatory/supervisory  regime  recently
adopted  in Argentina,  are examples  of how government  can incorporate  substantive  incentives
within  the regulatory  framework  (Calomiris,  1997).
Various  measures  can strengthen  prudential  regulation  and supervision  along  market-
compatible  principles.  First, as domestic  banks are allowed  to earn  extra rents through financial
restraints  to build reputational  capital,  a system  of sanctions  for misconduct  should  be enacted
and strictly  enforced.  The scheme  adopted  in the US in 1991  as part of the deposit  insurance
reform  (The  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  Improvement  Act) provides a good  example
of incentive-based  corrective  measures  for under-capitalized  financial  institutions.  The corrective
measures  -whose  intensity  varies  with the degree  of bank under-capitalization  - involve:  limits on
deposit  taking,  suspensions  of dividends,  requirement  of a capital  restoration  plan, restrictions  on
asset growth,  approvals  required  for acquisitions,  branching  and new activities,  ordering  of
recapitalization  by existing  owners,  restricting  inter-affiliate  transactions,  restricting  deposit  rates,
restrict pay of officers,  suspension  of payment on subordinated  debt,  restricting  certain  other
activities,  initiation  of resolution  process,  and initiation  of receivership/conservatorship.
Prudential  supervision  could  mimic the market also by rewarding  prudent  and honest behaviors
with positive  incentives;  these could  include differential  capital requirements  based on the quality
of intemal risk-management  systems,  reduced  supervisory  monitoring  and fewer  prescription
rules for institutions  judged to be superior  performers  (Group  of Thirty, 1997).
Second,  asset growth  restrictions  could  be considered  by the supervisory  authorities  when
rapid bank portfolio  shifts are observed  during  reform,  threatening  the steady  buildup  of
reputational  capital.  Regulatory  restrictions  would  thus supplement  the lack of internal  risk-
rmanagement  methods  and risk-sensitive  managers,  and curb speculation  driven  by banks
unaccustomed  to risk management  and yet lured by easy gains from rapid-growing  asset prices.
Especially  early  in the reform  process,  the franchise  value of domestic  banks is likely to be highly
sensitive  to the dynamics  of asset portfolios,  which depends  on the portfolios' structure  in the pre-
reform stage  and on structural  adjustment  measures  introduced  with reform (Caprio, 1994).  For
example,  if pre-reform  credit programs  limited  banks' real estate exposures,  ending  this would
lead to investment  in property  and,  possibly,  to speculative  bubbles (witness  Malaysia  in the
1970s).  Similarly,  if the pre-reform  environment  featured  forced  allocation  of government  bonds
at below-market  rates, ending  the constraint  could  generate  portfolio  shifts toward higher  yielding
and riskier investments.
On the other hand, where  financial  sector  reform and real sector's structural  adjustment
take place simultaneously,  uncertainty  and lack of information  may drive  domestic  banks to
retreat into  riskless assets  and cut credit to the economy.  "Speed  limits" on bank asset growth and
29portfolio  limits have  been proposed  (Caprio  et al., 1994  and Vittas, 1992),  on grounds  that rapid
loan growth  has often  been associated  with individual,  as well as systemic,  bank failures.  Such
limits should  aim to ensure  risk diversification  and a smooth  and reasonably  sustainable  growth.
They could  embody  some flexibility  (for instance,  they could  be linked  to the capital ratios of the
individual  banks) and should  be revised  gradually  to avoid  big distortions  of credit flows  to
particular  sectors.  As in the case  of financial  restraints,  growth  and portfolio  limits should  be
time-bound,  used to ease  the transition  from one regime to another  (especially  in markets with
many inexperienced  players)  and to stymie  incipient  speculative  bubbles.
Third,  authorities  should  place particular  emphasis  on the strength  of banks' financial
capital.  The  Basle Accord  on capital  adequacy  addresses  this question  directly  by setting
minimum  capital  requirements  for internationally  active  banks,  determined  on the basis of the risk
structure  of their portfolios.  Of course,  using capital  ratios as a supervisory  device for monitoring
and enforcing  appropriate  risk management  requires  that capital  be meaningfully  measured.  This,
in turn, requires  clear notions of what constitute  capital.  It also presumes  adequate  procedures  for
evaluating  asset quality and for determining  proper levels  of provisions  and loan loss reserves.  In
short, it requires  good accounting  practices  and sophistication  on the part of bank managers  and
supervisors.
It is a subject of debate  whether  capital  requirements  in emerging  economies  should  be
higher  than in industrial economies.  On the one hand, it is sensible  to argue  that banks operating
in a more risky environment  should  have  a stronger  capital  base. Small community  banks in the
US, for example,  tend  to have  higher capital  ratios that money  center banks,  partly because  their
portfolio  tend to be less diversified.  Inadequate  accounting  practices,  leading to difficulties  in
assessing  capital and assets  also argue  for a greater  capital cushion.  On the other  hand, several
concerns  can  be raised: higher  capital  requirements  could  lead banks to select a point further  out
on the risk/return  frontier,  or to disintermediation,  or book loans in offshore  subsidiaries
(Honohan,  1997).  Alternatively,  to comply  with higher  capital  requirements,  banks may be forced
to invest  an excessive  portion  of their assets  in government  bonds which typically  bear lower
private (and social)  returns (Hellmann  and Murdock,  1995).34  Another  limitation  is that
compliance  with capital  ratios from a bank may induce  complacency  both from the bank's
management,  as well as from counterparties,  as to the bank's presumed  minimal  default-risk
standing:  management  might feel it to be unnecessary  to further  improve  the bank's risk position
and counterparties,  on their side,  might consider  for them  unnecessary  to further  assess  the
riskiness  of the bank. Finally,  the inadequacy  of the static accounting  framework,  underpinning
the capital  ratios approach,  in tracing  the dynamics  of the  bank's trading strategy;  for example,
hedging  asset positions  through  collateral  margining  is not captured  by the static assessments  of
capital  adequacy  (Nickerson,  1995).
Strengthening  supervisory  practices  and improving  ratio calculation  better to reflect  the
riskiness  of certain  asset categories  could  help deal with some of the above  limitations.  Other
drawbacks,  however,  cause  the capital  ratios approach  to generate  incorrect  incentives.  Capital
requirements  ignore  the interaction  effects  between  assets  in the same  portfolio: if the asset  prices
show negative  correlations,  the capital necessary  to back the overall  portfolio  exposure  against
the risk of counterparty  default  is less than the sum of the capital  requirements  necessary  to back
the asset positions  taken in isolation.  The same  holds if the portfolio  comprises  mutually
offsetting  claims on income  flows (such  as ,for  instance,  two identical swaps  with the same
counterparty,  of which one would  be the reverse  of the other),  as not all claims can have positive
market value  at the same  time.  Disregarding  these factors  may resolve  in much higher  capital
requirements  than necessary,  with considerable  inefficiencies  in resource  allocation,  undue costs
on the banks, and a weakening  of their international  competitive  position.
30The preceding limitations suggest some useful policy indications. Where resource
constraints make even minimum capital requirements excessively costly for individual banks, it
would be advisable for regulators to accept lower capital ratio levels and to build from there
gradually as the financial conditions of the banks improve over time: slow and gradual
movements, but consistent with the overall policy objectives, are better and ultimately conducive
to credibility than more ambitious but unsuccessful attempts to jump to high standards. Moreover,
capital ratios should be consistent with the projected profitability of banks and the amount of
public support that is available.
Transitional measures could be introduced to cushion the effects of new accounting
practices on asset valuation, giving banks more time to adjust to new rules without weakening
them. For this to be successful, however, authorities should pre-commit publicly to the end-
targets and the timeframe. They should explain to the public the reasons for agreeing on lower
requirements and that they hold institutions to the announced standards. This would put the
credibility of policymakers at stake and give governments an incentive for time consistency.
Regulation should force the authorities to take graduated action with financial institutions
showing problems, possibly in accordance with a pre-defined sequence of policy steps; this would
limit their flexibility in deciding when and whether to intervene in individual cases, and would
boundl  them to take transparent decisions on forbearance.
Furthermore, as banks develop their own risk-management capacity and increase their
activity in the international markets, they should be advised - and assisted - to replace static
capital ratios with more advanced methods for economic capital allocation 35 that would allow
them to economize on resources and reflect more correctly the risks associated with financial
instruments and counterparties. This is consistent with the Basle Capital Accord (Padoa-
Schioppa, 1996); it would make the effects of risk diversification more visible and directly
measurable, and would strengthen the banks' incentives to diversify their portfolio. Progress
toward the adoption of more advanced risk-management systems would require: (i) greater
technical competence on the side of regulators, who would be called upon to assess the soundness
of the methodologies adopted by the banks, and to verify their effective implementation; (ii)
collection and dissemination of data and information necessary to feed the risk-management; and
(iii) technical assistance to bank traders and supervisors to acquire and maintain the necessary
expertise.
As more advanced risk-management systems are introduced, new market regulations
should: 1) require banks to disclose their market and credit risk position; 2) require banks to raise
their capital if  this shows to be insufficient to back their reported risks; 3) prevent banks from
deliberately underestimating their potential losses by requiring them to put up some extra capital
in the event that actual losses exceeded the ex-ante estimations (i.e., restore their capital or
maintain higher ratios as a penalty); 4) prohibit banks from undertaking speculative activities, at
least umtil  they have reached a high level of reputational capital; and 5) as banks are allowed to
undertake such activities, require them to separate hedging from speculative positions and to
place the latter in separate subsidiaries or affiliates. 36
Adopting incentives-based safety nets
Safety-nets to reduce systemic risk should minimize the moral hazardfrom  stakeholders by
limiting risk protection and by making the cost ofprotection  sensitive to the risk  taken.
31The circuit is vulnerable to financial crises. The perception of an increasing systemic risk
may lead market participants to interrupt the flow of funds causing circuit breakdowns along the
process, and eventually a major circuit collapse altogether. Moreover, the fiscal costs of resolving
systemic crises and their effects on output understandably make governments acutely aware that
measures must be taken to avoid them and keep the circuit running - typically, through lending of
last resort and central bank liquidity facilities for payment systems, conservatorship, and
insurance of bank deposits. The following discussion focuses on the incentive structure
underlying deposit insurance. 37
In many countries, the safety net adopted by governments is deposit insurance. Deposit-
insurance schemes differ across countries. In most cases, deposit insurance amounts to an implicit
government promise of loss coverage from the public budget; that is, bankers and depositors
assume that government stands ready to absorb banks' losses if there is a crisis. More formal
schemes with explicit insurance terms and covenant rights are becoming increasingly popular.
Whatever the form, deposit insurance schemes are intended to prevent bank runs, thus eliminating
a principal cause for transmitting financial shocks throughout the circuit.
Experience in both industrial and emerging economies has shown, especially in the 1980's,
that financial risks are not entirely exogenous and that most are deliberately taken by institutions
38 and individuals acting upon knowing that they are protected by some form of public insurance.
Circuit breakdowns of huge proportions have been in countries with deposit-insurance
arrangements and, as it turned out, some of these were themselves a destabilizing factor through
perverse incentives to aggressive risk-takers.
Moral hazard is a serious problem. With deposit insurance, bank managers need to be less
concerned about the potential impact of their decisions on depositors and, hence, on the banks'
reputational capital. For the same reason, depositors have less of an incentive to monitor bank
managers, or to assess the reputational capital of banks where they deposit their money: the
government protects their money to some extent, anyway. On the other hand, if depositors did
monitor bank managers scrupulously, bank runs could happen and have systemic consequences,
possibly involving sound financial and non-financial institutions together with defaulting ones in
insolvency or serious illiquidity problems.
From the overall effect on welfare, the debate on safety nets has recently turned to
discussing their  incentive structure: policymakers are interested to know how to retain the
positive features of a public safety net while limiting its moral hazard effects3 9 Consensus seems
to converge on the idea that deposit insurance should be explicit, with limited coverage and
mandated membership, and with government powers to promptly intervene in weak participating
banks, although implicit guarantees are usually ambiguous, which should make agents sensitive
about the risk of not being bailed out. Clearly, this assumes that the terms of the arrangement are
fully credible. If credibility is lacking, explicit insurance schemes may even increase moral
hazard to grow.
Explicit schemes could be designed to  provide coverage only for small deposits, so as to
protect agents - i.e., small depositors - with greater information costs and lesser incentives to
monitor and exert governance on banks. It is held that large, uninsured depositors would
discipline banks as they would stand to lose if the bank defaulted. However, to the extent that
large depositors can split their deposits into series of small deposits the system can get spoiled
easily. Alternatively, the insurance could cover a large constant fraction of all deposits: all
depositors would retain an incentive to respond to changes in bank risks. In practice, what
appears to be a very difficult task for the government is to identify the optimal insurance
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monitor  their  banks; on the other,  in the event of a high perceived  risk of financial  instability,  too
low a coverage  might not prevent  deposit  runs and would  thus make insurance  purposeless.
Bank discipline  might  be improved  if insurance  premiums  were correlated  with bank risks.
Stronger  discipline  could also be attained  if small  depositors  had an incentive  to monitor  banks.
Limited  insurance  coverage  would likely induce  both large and small depositors  to consider  more
carefully  their bank risk. A strong  incentive  would  hold if depositors  were asked  to pay insurance
premiums  correlated  with bank risks. The incentive  would  be strengthened  further  if insurance
services  were to be provided  by competing  private  insurers.  As private insurance  would  be
pressed  to correlate  premiums  with bank risks (certainly  under stronger  pressure,  and with better
capabilities,  than government  bureaucrats),  the demand  for information  from banks and their
pressure  for good  bank govemance  would  be considerable.  However,  in the absence  of means  to
control  bank risks effectively,  determining  the "right"  premium  remains a very difficult
undertaking  since  banks can always  take on more risks  than those reflected  in the premiums.
An alternative  to reform  the incentive-structure  of deposit  insurance  is a subordinate-debt
requirement  (Keehn, 1989;  Wall, 1989;  Calomiris,  1997).  This scheme  relies on the "informed
agent" assumption.  Banks would  be required  to finance a small portion  of their non-reserve  assets
with subordinated  debt (uninsured  certificates  of deposits),  bearing  interest not greater  than the
riskless  rate plus a given spread.  Under such constraint,  all bank debt should carry  risk-premiums
within  the given  spread.  Holders  of subordinated  would  be well informed  market participants  who
faced  the tradeoff  between  holding  a higher-earning  bank liability and receiving  no protection
from bank default.  Subordinate-debt  holders would  have an incentive  to monitor  that banks keep
their overall  portfolio  risk consistent  with the maximum  risk-premium  requirement;  their superior
information  would  allow them to dispose  of their holdings  as bank risk were to evolve
inconsistently  with the requirement.  The limitation  on the yield spread  would also help the insurer
to set insurance  premiums  closer  to the true  risk of the banks (Calomiris,  cit.).
This incentive  mechanism  would supply  the market  with reliable signals on behavior  of
banks,  provided  there  was a liquid secondary  market  for the subordinated  debt,  and that the
requirement  to issue the debt was credible  and effective  in the first place. For this purpose,  banks
should  not be allowed  to purchase  their own debt,  or to overprice  debt with sidepayments  to
debtholders  (Calomiris, cit.).
An alternative  to safety  net is "narrow  banking".  A narrow  bank, chartered  within  a bank
holding  company,  would issue insured  deposits  fully  backed  by low-risk,  market-priced  assets.
All other  bank holding  company's  operations  would  be unregulated,  and deposits  outside  the
narrow  bank would be restricted  to uninsured  time deposits.  However,  to the extent that banks
can lure  depositors  into uninsured  short-term  deposits  bearing  higher  yields,  the narrow  banking
scheme  would still leave the system  unprotected  and banks vulnerable  to runs in the event  of
perceived  risks  by depositors.  In the light of such vulnerability,  narrow  banking  is not politically
credible  as bank runs could still be used to motivate  government  interventions  to protect
uninsured  deposits.
At the heart of all forms of safety  net thus lies a fundamental  incentive  problem  relating  to
the credibility  of the government  implementing  the safety  net and its ability  to commit  itself to
avoiding  bailouts.  Both explicit  (limited)  deposit  insurance  and narrow  banking lose their
rationale  if they fail to alter depositors'  perception  as to the likelihood  of government  intervention
in the event  of systemic  crisis (Honohan,  cit.).
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Incentives  to build  a strong reputational  capital  and to increase  the  franchise value  offinancial
institutions  may resultfrom the interest  of individual  market  participants  to establish  long-term
mutual bonds  that ensure  honest  and  prudent behavior  through  self-policing.  Government  should
encourage  the adoption  of self-policing  by supporting  private-sector  cooperative  arrangements  at
the industry  level and should closely  monitor  their  progress.  Such arrangements  can significantly
improve  circuit  stability  by providing  efficient  and safe  financial infrastructuralfacilities.
Enforcement  is a key ingredient  for the integrity  of the financial  circuit.  Very often,  poor
enforcement,  rather than lack of rules, is the cause  of financial  sector  problems,  especially  in
developing  economies.  Institutions  that provide  people  with incentives  to mutually  monitor their
action can help enforce  rules for the stability  of the circuit.  Incentives  to build a strong
reputational  capital  and increase  franchise  value  may result from the interest  that private-sector
agents  take in establishing  long-term  mutual  bonds to enforce  honest and prudent  behavior
through self-policing.  Self-policing  is particularly  effective  in contexts  where individual  behavior
affects  the financial  retums to the other  participants,  Effective  self-policing  increases  the
franchise  value of institutions  with higher  reputational  capital  and induces  investment  in
reputational  capital.  By doing so, it enhances  the overall  stability  of the circuit  process.
Spontaneous  self-policing  arrangements  can  be found in the history of international  trade
and commercial  law, public security  and maintenance  of public services,  and commercial  bank
clearinghouses. 40 In developing  countries,  such  arrangements  are common  for governing  and
managing  natural  resources  (Ostrom,  1990).  Self-policing  arrangements  allow  participants  to
undertake  transactions  that would otherwise  be unprofitable  due to high transaction  costs.
Self-policing  arrangements  may develop  within  financial  communities  as well (Goodhart,
1986).  In some cases, they evolve  into fully fledged  self-regulatory  organizations  (SROs),  with
internal  statutory  rules, financial  resources,  and formal  structures  involving  shareholders,
managers  and employees,  codes  of conduct  and oversight  procedures  (Glaessner,  1993).  Many
countries  today adopt SROs  in payments  and securities  markets.  SROs  could  range from
interbank  deposit  markets,  to wholesale  and retail payment systems,  securities  trading  and stock
exchanges,  securities  lending  and settlement  clearinghouse  services,  deposit  insurance,  credit
information  sharing  systems.  SRO  responsibilities  could encompass  regulation  of market
transactions  (listing  requirements,  market  and system surveillance,  trading  regulations,  clearing
and settlement,  information  disclosures);  regulation  of market participants  (admission  and
licensing,  capital  requirements,  business  and ethical  conduct);  disputes  resolutions  and
enforcement  actions,  including  those that deal with insider  trading. SROs  can  play a significant
role in ensuring  the smooth  functioning  of vital links of the circuit.
The  underlying  rationale  of SROs  is to exploit  the self-interest  of members  by rewarding
compliance  with rules and punishing  non-compliance  with commensurate  retums/losses  on
reputational  capital.  Members  ultimately  face the risk of losing  their entire reputational  capital  by
being  ostracized  by their peers. SROs  place reputational  capital  at the center of the enforcement
mechanism;  by doing so, they reduce  transaction  costs associated  to limited information  and
incomplete  trust. Mutual  bonds  in financial  SROs  typically  involve:
*  admission  criteria:  the selection  of new members  tend to determine  the adequacy  of their
reputational  capital. 42 Institutions  wishing  to enter  the community  in light of expected  profits
have an incentive  to invest in reputational  capital;
34*  rules of conduct governing member relationships and their business activity. Compliance
with rules is what allows for transaction costs to be reduced, and ultimately represents the
benchmark against which the value of the reputational capital of each member is assessed by
the others;
*  rules  for  information provision, governing disclosure, sharing and reporting of information.
Information is what keeps the incentive mechanisms alive and going: with limited
information or with deliberately hidden information about past behavior of community's
members, there are no incentives for honest and prudent behavior;
*  sanctions for non compliance (including suspension and exclusion). Members must be
motivated to execute sanctions against non-compliant behaviors.
Incentives in financial SROs - especially in interbank payment and settlement systems - can
be strengthened by members agreeing to individually pre-commit resources - in the form of
mutual lending obligations or collateral pooling - that would be mobilized in the event of one or
more members running into illiquidity or insolvency problems. Pre-commitments to liquidity- and
loss-sharing arrangements generate incentives for each member to monitor the behavior of the
others, to agree on and to enforce information disclosure rules, and to take action in case of
misbehaviors.
Liquidity and loss-sharing arrangements protect the circuit from the systemic consequences
of failures of one or more financial institutions. They thus afford supervisors some higher degrees
of freedom in deciding whether to let insolvent institutions fail, and enhance the certainty of
government exit policies. To the extent that greater certainty lessens the agents' expectations of
govemment bailouts or forbearance, financial institutions are faced with a stronger incentive to
good conduct.
Some problems may complicate the setting up of financial SROs in developing countries.
Scarcity of institutional and human resources may constrain the quality of oversight, and lack of
reasonably homogenous institutions could impede the formation of internally balanced structures.
Moreover, with limited competition in securities markets, self-regulation may not be enough to
ensure safe and efficient markets. Also, SROs might transform themselves into cartels and
jeopardize competition. Finally, short-term tensions between market development objectives and
the SROs' authorities - such as, for example, on the looseness of listing requirements - might
resolve either in discouraging participation, or in diminishing long-term confidence in the market.
Even so, financial SROs in emerging economies could help improve the efficiency-stability
tradeoff. Because of their knowledge and experience, and because of their comrnercial interest,
SROs are better placed than government bureaucrats to design rules consistent with the
operational features of their business, to keep their operational processes and infrastructures
apace with technological progress, and to improve their business standards. In particular, since
information is vital to each SRO member, the SRO setting is better positioned than government
regulatory agencies to achieve enforcement of disclosure rules through peer monitoring. Also, by
being part of the industry, SRO owners and managers have an incentive to keep up with the
institutional and organizational developments in the industrial economies. Furthermore, the SRO
model offers an appropriate institutional setting to develop market microstructures that facilitate
securities trading and market liquidity across the circuit.
Government has a key role to play in supporting the formation of financial community ties
along self-regulatory principles. It could delegate to domestic financial institutions the task to
form industry groups for governing and running specialized markets. SROs should organize
themselves, address the planning and operational issues, identify functions, rules and codes of
35conduct,  setup oversight  mechanisms,  all under  the supervision  of the relevant  public authorities.
Participants  to SROs  could be called  upon to share in the financing  of the investment  and
operating  expenses  involved  in its functioning.
Through  direct involvement,  the process  would  lead SRO  members  to seek transparency
from each other.  Information  sharing  through  institutional  and interpersonal  communication
would  help  members  develop  better relations. Similarly,  consultation  between  members  and
supervisors  would  help both to gain  a better understanding  of their respective  positions,  and
improve their cooperation.
The efficiency  of dispute  resolutions  and adjudication  processes  is crucial  for the success  of
SROs. 43 Government  should  not preclude (indeed,  it should  encourage)  private  judicial
mechanisms  and institutions  that serve  to enforce  good  conduct.  This would  be particularly  useful
in countries  with slow  judicial processes  and where  the general  orientation  of the law is biased
against  private commercial  practice.  In a number  of cases,  out-of-court  procedures have  been
successfully  employed  to govern  corporate  restructuring  processes  (Claessens,  1998).
By adding  strands  to the web of restraints  that curb imprudent  and honest behavior,  SROs
can strengthen  the financial  circuit.  They should  be seen as complement  of, rather than substitute
for, prudential  regulation  and supervision.  Government  should  monitor  their operation  and
intervene  promptly  if their action deviates  from their purposes.  Government  should  ensure that
SRO  rules are fair and based on stability  and efficiency  principles.  It should  protect market
competition  and ensure  that SRO  information,  monitoring  and sanctioning  systems  are
compatible  with fair competition.  In particular,  government  should  assess SRO entry and
sanctioning  criteria,  and ban discriminatory  and unfair  practices.  Government  should  also ensure
that SRO  rules and operations  are not detrimental  to small  participants  and consumers,  and that
underserved  constituents  have fair access  to their services.
Supervisory  authorities  should  ensure  that SRO members,  shareholders,  managers  and
employees  have  proper incentives.  They should  make sure  that members  are fully aware  of the
risks of their  business,  and that their risk-management  capacity  is sufficient  to make the market
robust and resilient  against  large financial  and operational  shocks44  For SROs  governing  and
running  technical  infrastructures,  government  should  make sure that their technical  and
operational  capacity  is adequate  and well-maintained.
11.2.3 Information
Enhancing production and conveyance of information
A critical componentfor  the smooth  functioning  and integrity of the circuit is the improvement of
the quality and quantity of available information. To the extent that financial  institutions invest in
reputational capital andfinancial  investors have an interest to combine risks and returns
efficiently, there are considerable incentivesfor  information to be searched and supplied, andfor
specialization and cooperative arrangements to arise in the business of information provision.
Governments can greatly improve incentives for optimal provision of information.
The discussion  of SROs  has underscored  the importance  of information  for making
sanctioning  systems  effective.  Information  permits  the incentive  mechanism  to work and
36enhances the franchise of the agents with higher reputational capital. Information is essential for
the smooth functioning and integrity of the circuit in a decentralized-decision environment, as
intra-circuit and inter-circuit stability depends crucially on the reconciliation of decisions from
capital good producers, investing companies, and savers. As stability requires agents to deploy a
high reputational capital, information is necessary to signal efficiently across the circuit the true
level of reputational capital of individual agents: inadequate information would weaken the
incentive to investments in reputational capital, shorten the agents' time horizon, and raise the
potential for profit from imprudent and dishonest behavior. A critical component of financial
sector reform is thus the improvement of the information generation and dissemination process.
Investors need to know about the creditworthiness of financial intermediaries and the quality of
financial services they purchase, just as intermediaries need to assess the reliability of their
counterparties and borrowers, and need to know about their misconduct.
Government action to set the right incentives can help a private market for information to
develop. Information provision involves two stages: production and conveyance: searching,
inspecting, testing, evaluating, interpreting and judging are parts of the production process of
information; disseminating information to the general public through reports or advertising
campaigns, and providing individualized information to specific inquirers are ways to convey
information (Klein, 1997b). Provided that financial institutions have invested in reputational
capital and that investors have optimize their risk/return tradeoffs, there are incentives for
information to be searched and supplied.
On the demand side, sensitivity to capital losses motivates investors to use information to
screen, select and monitor intermediating financial institutions to minimizing risks of loss,
directly or through specialized institutions. In developing countries, where banks represent the
largest share of domestic financial markets, governments should exploit the interest of depositors
in sound banking and use it to improve the supply of financial information. Reliable and timely
information is essential if market participants are to accurately judge the quality and strength of
banks, and to reward or punish them according to performance and risk-taking attitude. 45
Market demand for information would prompt the intermediaries seeking to enhance their
reputation to spontaneously provide reliable information. For example, where there is a
subordinated debt requirement for banks, healthy banks have an incentive to disclose their true
status, so that subordinated-debt holders, otherwise unable to discriminate good from bad banks,
do not indiscriminately sell their holdings in the face of aggregate shocks.
Information transmission is critical also for the buildup of reputational capital. As we learn
from consumer choice theory, the reputational capital of an agent operating in a large,
competitive market is not only sensitive to her repeated dealings with the same counterparties,
but also to extended dealings. An extended dealing occurs when a supplier's  customer shares
information with other agents on the quality of service received. Through extended dealings, the
reputational capital of an agent can be assessed prior to dealing with her. hi financial markets,
institutions with a high franchise value seeks to exploit extended dealings by disclosing more
information to their clientele (Hellmann et al., 1995).
This incentive may increase under regulation allowing banks to operate in various
segments of the capital market, since reputational capital in one segment affect franchise values
in other segments. This, on the one hand, makes it easier for a well-reputed bank to establish itself
in new business ventures; on the other hand, it gives the bank an incentive to act prudently and
honestly in the new segments as misbehavior could damage her reputational capital across all
segments.
37The same incentive may be generated by allowing financial institution to operate across the
whole maturity spectrum. If banks are restricted to operate either in short-term or long-term
activities, incentives could more easily lead short-term lenders to overfinance capital good
production and to possible circuit breakdowns. If banks are allowed to operate across the whole
maturity spectrum, they have more information on long-term market conditions and have
incentives to use information efficiently, since imprudent behavior could cause them to lose in all
maturity segments: a bank that lends short-term to capital good producers, but that also has an
interest in the long-term investment business, is likely more cautious in taking extra short-term
risks if it knows that investment demand is drying up in the economy, or that real capital
profitability is declining. The internalization of information within the same institution may thus
enhance intra-circuit and inter-circuit stability by reducing the incentive to overfinancing.
The demand and supply factors just discussed generate conditions for agents to specialize
in the provision of financial information. Credit bureaus, rating agencies, securities underwriters
are examples of financial information providers that facilitate investors' decisions by reducing
information asymmetries. Interbank information sharing on borrowers, for example, is shown to
increase lending volumes where safe borrowers are otherwise priced out of the market due to
adverse selection (Jappelli and Pagano, 1991).
Inforrnation can be provided uniformly and disseminated widely through, for instance,
periodic standardized reports on financial institutions, or it could be customized for individual
clients. Matching or referral services - such as the well-known accreditation schemes in the US
health sector - could also be provided by private sector agencies to inform clients about quality,
terms and conditions to be expected from individual financial institutions. Financial referral
services can rely on information disseminated by public agencies or made available by the
financial institutions themselves, and on clients'  evaluations, opinions and satisfaction rating.
Referral services involve a reputational mechanism which would provide a channel for financial
institutions to advertise their reputational capital to new potential client investors and service
users on the basis of verifiable and tested information. Information providers might be either
profit or non-profit outfits.
Providers of customized information might operate for a profit and sell specialized reports
for a fee. If inforrnation is proprietary, its production can be profitable. Providers of uniform
information might organize themselves as consumer unions or  producer cooperatives and be
remunerated by their respective communities (Klein, 1  997a). In the case of interbank systems for
credit-risk information sharing, for example, increasing returns associated with additional
participating banks tend to make the systems operate as natural monopolies (Jappelli and Pagano,
cit.); in this case, they might organize themselves as SROs.
Government can play an important role in the provision of information. It could subsidize
for a while one or a few private enterprises until a market takes off. Through SROs, the
government could induce private-sector financial institutions to set up information services for
their mutual benefit and for the benefit of clients. Government could initially provide information
services directly, as in the case of the Central de Deudores in Argentina, and later let the private
sector take over (Calomiris, 1997; World Bank, 1998).
Government could also provide infrastructure that would ease the flow of  private
information. It could disseminate information on bank credit risk collected in its banking
supervisory capacity, and establish a centralized registry for collateral. Information on bank credit
risk would provide basic inputs for more analytical assessments by specialized institutions, who
could cross-check or combine that information with other market or network information4 6 It
would also make it possible for rating agencies to credit-score smaller firms which normally do
not get ratings, thereby enabling these firms to have access to financial services otherwise
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information on collateral use and would therefore help lenders make better decisions on lending
volumes and allocation.47  Furthermore, the government could support the training of
professionals in financial information (accountants, auditors, market-survey specialist, IT experts,
economists). Finally, the government could compile and disseminate statistical information
necessary for the more advanced risk-management technologies.
Intemational discussions are currently debating the idea to promote incentives for sound
finance through an international rating of financial systems. Governments could ask to have their
financial systems and regulatory/supervisory regimes rated by one or more specialized bodies -
peer groups, private rating agencies, official bodies, and so on. The rating, which would be made
public, would evaluate domestic policies and quality of domestic regulation aind  supervision, and
make qualitative assessments. This would almost certainly alter the incentives of governments
which do not abide by international standards of sound financial practice to take corrective action,
especially to the extent that ratings affected a country's borrowing costs.
Sound information provision may significantly improve the incentive structure of the
circuit process. Information providers, however, should not replace supervisors, but complement
them. Even with good information, the circuit remains vulnerable to bouts of over-enthusiasm
and over-pessimism, when agents tend to alter the value of information and overreact to it
depending on what they expect others to do. Thus, close monitoring of markets and institutions
by well-trained supervisors is necessary, as well as clear and timely policy responses from them
to abnormal conditions.
Strengthening informal finance
Governments should exploit the informational comparative advantage of informalfinancial
institutions and strengthen the complementarity between the formal  and the informal sectors.
The poorest people of rural and urban societies live beyond the frontier of formal finance,
or outside the formal financial circuit. Here, credit is scarce, costly, and related to social ties.
Financial transactions are personalized and often conducted directly, or through informally
established groups or institutions. Savings are held in cash or secure real commodities, and often
lent to relatives or friends on terms of reciprocal assistance. If an economy is to develop, it needs
to progressively allow for the transition of its informal actors to the formal circuit. Incentives can
help.
Informal financial service providers have an incentive to deal with small amounts of
mnoney  and to interact with people spread widely across the country. They do not carry the cost of
documentation and bookkeeping, and act upon information exchanged through face-to-face
relationships and on rules enforced through social control. This makes honest informal
intermediaries much better placed than formal institutions and government agencies to reach out
effectively to people beyond the frontier, and to implant the principles of a market credit culture.
Experience shows that informal low-cost remittance networks can provide efficient money
transfer services to immigrant workers; that rotating savings and credit associations and, in
general, self-policing arrangements based on strong social ties, can effect stable term
transformation of liquid funds and fund long-term investment projects; that the social
mechanisms of information provision and rule enforcement allow informal lenders to tailor their
loan terms and conditions upon the specific characteristics and the needs of individual borrowers,
overcoming the rigidities typically embedded in the standards conditions of official finance.
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informal financial institutions (Yaron, et. al, 1997). Reforming the financial sector in developing
countries should aim at strengthening the complementarity between formal and informal sectors.
Formal financial institutions who do not find uneconomical to deal with informal borrowers
directly could operate through informal lenders; these would act as second-layer intermediaries:
large pools of small savings could be placed in formal financial institutions and thus benefit from
greater diversification and higher returns. Similarly, savings from the formal sector would flow
into informal-sector projects, something that would not normally happen. While formal
institutions could lend to the second-layer intermediaries against collateral, end-borrowers may
not have to pledge collateral. A well consolidated example of such form of complementarity is
offered in India by the non-banking financial companies sector (IPahwa,  1998).
Another important advantage of any informal-formal link is that formal financial
institutions would have an incentive to select the best informal service providers, and so eliminate
the low-quality ones from the market. The franchise value of those informal providers doing
business with formal institutions will increase Indeed, they would seek out ties with the formal
sector, a powerful incentive to strengthen their reputational capital by serving their community
fairly and efficiently. One example of successful links between the formal and the informal
sectors is offered by the monyeshops in the Philippines (Von Pischke, 1991).
Infornal  financial service providers must be able to price their services consistently with
the need for a fair return on the risks taken, and should be permitted to offer saving- and
transaction-services to their customers (for instance, saving and deposit accounts, money
transfers and payment services). Such services would enhance the information content of the
relationship between the service provider and her end-users, as they convey more information on
the income and payment time-profile (and, ultimately, on creditworthiness) of the loan customers,
and supply end-users with means to test the reliability and accessibility of providers. In close
communities, saving and transaction services increase the loan customers' incentive to repay their
loans, knowing that loans effectively come from their neighbors rather than distant, anonymous
agencies (Vogel, 1984). Furthermore, these services contribute to the formation of larger
financial savings by inducing small rural savers to convert their accumulated tangible stores of
value (jewelry, livestock, cash) into higher-yielding and more liquid financial assets. By doing so,
they add to the liquidity of the economy.
The government could also induce informal self-policing in rural and urban communities,
where ethnic bonds are stronger and some local leaders have a high reputation, by exploiting the
opportunity for low-cost information sharing and peer-pressure mechanisms that are typical of
small communities. Through peer-monitoring informal self-policing would improve considerably
the borrowers' debt- repayment capacity and lower transaction costs associated with lending to
informal borrowers (Stiglitz, 1993). Government should seek to gain firsthand knowledge of
developments and conditions in the informnal  sector through regular direct contacts with the local
communities of informal service end-users and through ad hoc surveys and research activity.
Government should sanction  informal providers who imposed unfair and exploitative terms on
loan and service customers, or endangered the trust basis of their communities, and should ensure
viable conditions for those who maintain a high reputational capital and serve their community
well.
In the longer term, incentives in the informal financial sector would strengthen the
domestic base of savers and borrowers, and increase the quality of resource allocation and use in
those parts of society otherwise condemned to stagnation and poverty. Government should thus
refrain from imposing plans that defy economic incentives like, for instance, forcing formal
40institutions  to undertake  unremunerative  activities  in support  of agents  outside  the frontier.
Allowing  informal  financial  service  providers,  as suggested  above,  to expand  the range  of
services  offered  outside  of the frontier  and to price such services  in line with the risks taken  is a
first important  step. Government  should also strengthen  the debt  repayment  capacity  of the agents
beyond  the frontier.  Investments  in physical infrastructure  in poor rural and urban areas  - for
example,  in the transport  and telecommunications  sectors;  introduction  of greater flexibility  in
price and wage regulations  that stimulate  commodity  supply  and labor employment;
improvements  in enforcement  of contracts  and property  claims;  regulatory  reforms in land titling
and registering,  and extension  of information  services,  can all very often  trigger significant
changes  in the income generation  capacity  of the local  people and prod their entrepreneurial  spirit
with relatively  modest  public spending.
Likewise,  governments  could  help the best performing  informal service  with technical  and
financial  assistance  on accounting  techniques,  financial  practices  (such as asset and liability
management),  project evaluation,  and performance  analysis,  monitoring,  management-
information  and risk-management  systems.  Government  could  mobilize  resource  expertise  both
to identify  technologies  and projects  best suited  to local community  needs to be supported
through  informal  financial  services,  and to train informal  service  providers  to work out with local
borrowers  more favorable  loan repayment  terms  and conditions,  and contingency  provisions.
*  *  *
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Appendix  I. Sequential  structure  of the CTF model
(A.1)  CR = CR(rI,,V(CR)) = wk
(A.la)  Wck  = vc±(C  1 )  +c  )  V,c  |
(A.-la)  c" = lcj  = c  Production
j=i,k
(A.2a)  wlk  = vis
(A.2b)  Is  = E[Id  ]
(A.3)  Yk  W  k  = Wck + Wlk
(A.4)  Ck  = Yk  Sk
(A.5)
(A.6)  Y  = Ck -CW.
(A.7)  CW = ack  Household
(A.8)  C,  = Y,  - Si  income- consumption-
(A.9a)  sj=i,k = sj  (yj, rL)  saving
(A.9b)  Si = sj [zj (rL, v) + 1-zj
(A.10)  r =zjrL 
(A.l1)  D=  (l-  Zh)Sh
h=i,j,f,b,F
(A.12a)  _d  d(  )  r
(A.12b)  |  =,u=  (Ko  + I)
(A.13)  LFd  =Id
(A.  14)  YF = qLF 5
(A.15a)  LFs  =  IZhSh  <￿S
h=i,j,f.b,F  Investment financing
(A.15b)  LFs  = LFs(r[,rL*)  Investment funding
(A.15c)  rL  = rL + q
(A.  15d)  rL=  [rL  [  (rL  )]max
(A.15e)  LF  =I  = min[LF',LFdI
(A.16)  Yf  =I+c-wk  Gross corporate income
42(A.17)  Y'  = Yf  - CR(1 + rs)  Net corporate income
(A.18)  Yb = yVCRrS  Bank income
(A.19)  S = EsJ +  Yf  + Yb + YF  Saving
j=i,k
Appendix  II. Saving in CTF
The  model described  in the text represents  a logical  circuit  of income  generation.  Its
dynamics  springs  from autonomous  (exogenous)  spending  decisions.  As this appendix  shows,
such dynamics  is throughout  conditioned  by the interactions  of individual  spending  (saving)
decisions.  Within  the circuit,  individual  spending  (saving)  decisions  are affected  by decisions
taken by agents  placed up-front  in the circuit,  who either have access  to external  financing  or
receive  their income  earlier  in the sequence.  The circuit  determines  the residual  (or passive)
nature of aggregate  saving (i.e.,  aggregate  saving  always  equals  aggregate  exogenous  spending),
notwithstanding  individual  households'  saving  plans, and whether  or not agents  behave  optimally
in this respect.  Below,  a simple  sequence  analysis  of model's  responses  to changes  in selected
variables  shows  the following  propositions  to hold in a closed  economy:
Proposition  1. For any given level of aggregate  investment,  changes  in individual  or sector
savings  do not affect  the volume  of aggregate  saving, although  they affect  the economy's  saving
ratio.
Suppose  that, with I given  at I',  agent  k increases  her current  consumption  temporarily,
while  agent i keeps hers unchanged.  As a result, cw, ci, and yf  increase  correspondingly. 48 Iff
saves  the extra income,  it directly  offsets  the initial  drop in aggregate  saving  caused  by k. But the
same  result  holds if firmf decides  to put the extra income  into new production:  new household
income  is generated  to the point where additional  savings  equalf s extra spending.  In the end,
aggregate  saving  remains  unchanged,  although  aggregate  output  has increased.
Aggregate  saving  remains  unchanged,  too, if k decreases  her consumption:  household i
might either  absorb on herself  the demand  shock  by reducing  her saving equivalently.  From E.  1,
the reduction  in i's saving is such  that  - ds, = rdsk and the effect onf s saving is
dsf  = (1 - y)dSk;  thus, the change  in aggregate  saving  is
dS=dsk  +dsi +df  =ds 1 -ydsk  -(1-)df  = 0 .Alternatively,  agent  i  might contravene  to
her Euler condition,  keep saving  unchanged,  and pass the full demand  shock on to firmf. This
would see its income  and saving  drop by an equivalent  amount.  Again, no change  in aggregate
saving could  occur.  These  results  yield irrespective  of how agents  plan  to allocate  their income
intertemporally. 49 Assume now that agent i increases her saving: i's lower consumption decreases
bothf  s income and saving correspondingly; therefore, aggregate saving does not change and
aggregate income falls. If the increase in k's saving is permanent (due, for instance, to a change in
k's rate of time preference), I may react in two alternative ways: she may either incorporate the
new information in her optimal saving plan and reduce intertemporal consumption as her income
drops permanently; or she could behave outside her Euler rule and keep consumption unchanged:
saving would drop enough to offset the initial increase in k's saving. The result is the same if the
additional saving originates from the corporate sector through, say, a cut inf  s wage costs. The
43impact of fs  larger saving would alternatively determine: an equivalent and permanent reduction
in k's consumption (which would ultimately feed back onf  s sales), if the original change were
perceived to be permanent by both k and i; or an equivalent and temporary cut in k's saving, in
case the change were perceived as temporary; or a combination of the two. But, in each case, the
final effect unambiguously consists of offsetting changes in individual or sectoral savings
somewhere in the economy that leave aggregate saving unchanged.
It can be shown that the invariance of aggregate saving for a given aggregate investment
obtains even if the agents mistakenly believe the initial changes in individual, or sectoral, savings
to be permanent (resp., temporary) when in fact they are transitory (resp., permanent).
Proposition 2. Changes in aggregate saving can only result from  changes in the level of
aggregate investment.
Consider an increase in I; this translates into an equivalent increase in wk  (below,, the case
is also considered where the increase in I does not fully translate into an equivalent increase in its
production cost). If  k perceives the increase to be temporary, optimality requires her to save it
all: no income change is transmitted to other agents, and aggregate investment, income and
saving all increase by an amount equal to the initial increase in I. On the other hand, if k perceives
the increase to be permanent (i.e., she expects  wkt+l  to increase by the same amount), she
decides to consume the additional income and alters optimal intertemporal consumption
accordingly. Moreover, if agent i does not change her saving patterns eitheli0, the increase in her
current and future income goes fully into consumption, andf  s profits increase correspondingly.
In the end, whether firmf  saves its profits, or uses them in production, aggregate saving increases
by as much as investment (see case under proposition 1). The same holds even if i does not
follow her optimal rule and saves the additional income from k's larger spending.
The result holds also in the general case that the increase in I exceeds the increase in its
production cost (as production adds value): the difference corresponds tof  s real capital
accumulation, and represents a positive (non-monetary) contribution to corporate (undistributed)
profit (i.e., corporate saving), which would just make up for the less than proportional increase in
corporate income from household consumption.
Proposition 3. Changes in the interest rate do not affect aggregate saving, although they may
alter its composition.
Assume that I is given, and assume that a change in rL  increases households' desire to
save. In a model without interactions, the increased savings of individual households directly
translate into larger aggregate saving and, hence, into a larger supply of long-term funds. With
interactions, this cannot happen. Note first that, from Euler condition E. 1, the adjustment in
optimal saving from agent i is smaller than is the case without interactions, given the feed back of
k's increased saving on her income. But whatever the households' response to interest rate
changes, any change in their saving is one-for-one reflected in the income and saving of the
corporate sector. Aggregate saving remains unchanged - although its composition has changed -
and no extra resources can be made available for additional long-term funding, even though
financial investors fund supplier are more willing to invest their funds at the new, higher interest
rate.
Interactions and sequencing across the circuit may generate considerable coordination
problems. Changes in the rate of interest simultaneously affect the saving plans of all the agents
in the economy. The revised saving plans may, or may not, all be mutually consistent and thus
optimal. 5"  In the event of coordination failures, some saving plans are invalidated expost,  with
some agents ending up with larger (or smaller) savings than desired: it is not possible for all
44agents  to simultaneously  change  their savings  to the new desired  levels.  Invariably,  however,
aggregate  saving  eventually  adjusts to the given  level of investment. 52
Appendix  III. Equilibrium  saving ratio
Domar growth  model is used to derive  for this purpose,  where  a simple dynamics  is
introduced  in real demand  and supply,  and the rates of growth  of both aggregate  saving and
output  are generated  by investment  growth:
AXt =  AIt
AY, =(1I/)AI
AXt  =AY
where aggregate  output,  X, is produced  through  linear production  function  X-AK, and I/A is the
capital/output ratio. Equilibrium requires x = g  with x = AX/X  .Defining b =  Al/  Y  (i.e.,
the accelerator)  and d,B = Al /X,  it can be shown  that  x = (1  + i)d/JA and g  = (bi / a)  - 1
where i = Al / I.  Solving  for a  yields the (equilibrium)  saving  ratio that ensures  balance
between  supply  and demand  growth:
(29)  a* = bi /[1  + (1  + i)d/JA]  [Q.E.D].
Appendix  IV. Resource  re-appropriation  by firms in the circuit
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Define  Xas aggregate  output  selling  at market-determined  price  p and produced  by N
workers,  with productivity  A and earning  wage w.  Assuming  propensity  to consume  equal  to
one, demand  from workers  is given  by wN. If I is the amount  of output  firms want to purchase
and I is the share of total labor  resources  necessary  to produce  it, then I = LtVp. Equilibrium
between  demand  and supply  requires
ANp = WN + lap
Output price is thus p  =
Defining  the profit  ratio as the ratio between  net output  and money spent on production
(i.e., the total wage bill)
w  1-1
I  P
total nominal profit is P =  zwN =  wN,  yielding real profit  - = AIN
1-i  p
45Note that the real profit equals the output share that firms decided to purchase. The well
known Kalecki's proposition is confinned whereby "workers spend what they earn, while
capitalists earn what they spend".
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36 These points were suggested to the author by Prof. Charles Calomiris.
37 On central bank lending and on conservatorship, see IMF (1998a). On issues relating to conservatorship,
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promote international private-sector cooperative arrangements at the industry levels. In the area of
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activities were organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. Certain conditions are necessary for self-
policing arrangements to emerge. First, a relationship of reciprocity must result from a deliberate and
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their action. If these conditions are met, the agents perceive potential gains from tying mutual bonds with
each other by entering into (formal or informal) arrangements, and potential costs from contravening such
arrangements once entered into. The first three conditions replicate Fuller's (1964) conditions for the
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members is at stake, this mechanism puts pressure on them to be confident enough  about the true quality of
the sponsored candidates.
43 As the examples from history show, self-policing arrangements have successfully governed themselves
even in the absence of coercive power of Government. Members formed their own courts to adjudicate
disputes, and courts'  decisions were accepted by members under the threat of reputational capital losses.
"Private" adjudication schemes guaranteed speed, informality and technical competence. The adjudicative
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importance of legal certainty for growth is assessed in recent studies by La Porta et al. (1996, 1997, and by
Levine et al., (1998).
44 See, in this respect, the approach adopted by the Group of Ten Central Banks (1990) for the oversight of
multilateral netting payment and settlement systems.
45 Martinez Peria and Schmuckler (1998) suggest that information greatly enhances market discipline in the
banking sector by allowing depositors to select banks according to their financial strength, quality of
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Institutions provides an example of public disclosure of bank credit risk  (see  Honohan, 1997).
4  points were suggested to the author by Prof. Charles Calomiris.
4It  is assumed that household-shopkeeper i does not hold inventory, so that k's changes in consumption
reflect directly intof  s sales. Assuming inventory stocks would not alter the results of the model.
49 These results show the existence of an inverse relationship between household and corporate savings for
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savings, and it would hold independently of compliance from individual agents with optimal rules or of
Ricardian equivalence effects. For empirical supporting evidence, see Eisner (1995).
50  This occurs if  agent i foresees correctly k's intertemporal allocation decisions and holds onto her
optimal rule.
51 In a model with agents' interaction, optimality of individual saving decisions implies compliance with a
dual condition: 1) ex-post individual savings must equal ex-ante individual savings, and 2) the sum of
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in force, no market mechanism ensures condition 1) if the agents fail to internalise the externalities
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53 This appendix draws on Graziani (1988).
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